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The legalization of physician aid in dying ("PAID") has been spreading across the
United States and is currently legal in ten jurisdictions. Meant to respect autonomy
at the end of life, PAID legislation is modeled after the Oregon Death with Dignity
Act, which permits only terminally ill adults with contemporaneous decisional
capacity to choose to hasten death with PAID. Right-to-die advocates and legal
scholars have critiqued the strict eligibility requirements, which although meant to
function as safeguards against mistakes and abuse, can be autonomy thwarting.
Advocates and scholars have thus proposed using advance directives for PAID to
expand access to this end-of-life option. Such a reform would permit terminally ill
persons with moderate dementia or other types of decisional impairments to access
PAID.
To date, scholars have neglected another possibility for respecting autonomy at the
end of life by expanding access to PAID for terminally ill persons with decisional
impairments: supported ecision-making. Supported decision-making legislation is
also spreading across the United States as an alternative to guardianship and
surrogate decision-making for persons with cognitive disabilities and is an option
in nine jurisdictions. With this model of decision-making, a person with a cognitive
disability receives decision-making assistance from supporters to facilitate the
exercise of autonomy and retain legal capacity.
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This Article is the first to address whether terminally ill persons with cognitive
impairments hould be able to access PAID through supported decision-making. If
provided with decision-making support, terminally ill persons with cognitive
impairments may be able to elect PAID intentionally, voluntarily, and with
understanding; that is, despite their impairments, such persons may be capable of
autonomous end-of-life decision-making. This Article thus argues that he principle
of equality demands that the law not exclude terminally ill supported persons with
decisional impairments from PAID. This Article also argues that supported
decision-making is a superior means for terminally ill persons with decisional
impairments to access this end-of-life option compared to advance directives, which
have numerous and well-documented problems.
This Article also considers how PAID and supported decision-making laws interact
in the one jurisdiction that currently has both laws, the District of Columbia, and
concludes that it may be permissible for a terminally ill person with a decisional
impairment, which would otherwise preclude them from accessing PAID, to elect
this end-of-life option with assistance from a supporter. The Article ends with
considerations for policymakers about building additional safeguards into these
laws to ensure that persons with cognitive disabilities do not mistakenly, without
understanding, or after the application of undue pressure hasten death through
PAID.
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INTRODUCTION
Right-to-die advocates have enjoyed recent success in their efforts to
legalize physician aid in dying ("PAID"), 1 an end-of-life option that has spread to
almost a fifth of the states and has strong public support.2 Where PAID is legal,
terminally ill adults with contemporaneous decisional capacity can voluntarily
request a prescription for a medication that, when self-administered, will hasten
death.3
One explicit purpose of PAID laws is to promote autonomy and dignity at
the end of life by allowing people to avoid suffering by choosing the time, place,
and manner of their deaths.4 But the laws do not permit everyone who may be
interested in PAID the option of using it as a means of hastening death. For example,
only adults may elect PAID, but mature minors who are facing a terminal illness
arguably have self-determination and dignitary interests in how their lives end as
well. Thus, PAID laws constrain the exercise of autonomy for some people at the
end of life.
This Article focuses on another important way in which access to PAID is
limited: the contemporaneous decisional capacity requirement. Terminally ill
persons who are interested in PAID, but lack decisional capacity5 because they have,
for instance, moderate dementia or decisional impairments due to a stroke, are not,
under current law, able to choose PAID. Requiring contemporaneous decisional
capacity for PAID is meant to function as a safeguard against mistake or abuse but
reduces the end-of-life options available to persons with decisional impairments.
1. Physician aid in dying is also known as physician-assisted suicide or medically
assisted dying. See David Orentlicher et al., The Changing Legal Climate for Physician Aid
in Dying, 311 JAMA 1961, 1961 (2014) (describing different terminology).
2. Megan Brenan, Americans' Strong Support for Euthanasia Persists, GALLUP
(May 31, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/235145/americans-strong-support-euthanasia-
persists.aspx (describing how 65% of Americans believe PAID should be legal).
3. In many other countries that have legalized medically assisted dying,
physician administration-i.e., euthanasia-is legal. See, e.g., Gov'T OF CANADA, Medical
Assistance in Dying, https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/medical-assistance-
dying.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2020). In the United States, euthanasia is illegal, which is
why there is a self-administration requirement for using PAID. Despite the illegality of
euthanasia, public opinion is more supportive of euthanasia (72%) than PAID (65%),
although survey researchers caution that this result may be an artifact of the wording of the
question. Brenan, supra note 2. However, the difference in support may reflect true
preferences given that in other countries, persons opt for euthanasia instead of self-
administration of the lethal medication. See, e.g., HEALTH CANADA, FOURTH INTERIM REPORT
ON MEDICAL ASSISTANCE IN DYING IN CANADA 5 (2019), https://www.canada.ca/content/d
am/hc-sc/documents/services/publications/health-system-services/medical-assistance-dying-
interim-report-april-2019/medical-assistance-dying-interim-report-april-2019-eng.pdf
(reporting that 1 out of 2,614 medically assisted deaths in 2018 resulted from self-
administration).
4. See Death with Dignity Acts, DEATH WITH DIGNITY,
https://www.deathwithdignity.org/learn/death-with-dignity-acts/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2020).
5. This Article uses phrases such as "lack decisional capacity," "decisional
impairments," and "cognitive disabilities" interchangeably.
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 63:157
The exclusion of persons with decisional impairments from PAID has led
some scholars to advocate for using advance directives for this end-of-life option.6
Under such proposals, advance directives for PAID would function similarly to
other types of written advance directives,7 which are a means to honor autonomy
even after capacity has been lost. Once a patient with a decisional impairment
becomes terminally ill (and thus eligible for PAID), surrogate decision-makers and
physicians would consult the patient's advance directive to determine whether the
patient desired PAID, and if so, the patient could be prescribed the lethal medication.
Adopting this proposed reform would respect he precedent autonomy of persons
with impaired decision-making.
But using advance directives causes several problems. For example, after
the completion of an advance directive and subsequent loss of decisional capacity,
a person may change their mind but be locked into their prior preferences.
Additionally, advance directives may be difficult for others to interpret, and even
when interpreted correctly, the directives are not always followed.8 If advance
directives are not functioning as intended in other circumstances, it may be unwise
to apply this problematic legal tool to another end-of-life context. Furthermore, the
proposal to use advance directives for PAID does not acknowledge that persons with
decisional impairments may be able to exercise autonomy upon becoming
terminally ill.
A better way to ensure respect for (contemporaneous) autonomy at the end
of life for persons with decisional impairments is with supported decision-making,
which disability advocates have successfully convinced several state legislatures to
adopt.9 With formal supported decision-making, persons with cognitive disabilities
voluntarily enter into agreements with supporters who provide decision-making
assistance. The person with a disability retains legal capacity despite decisional
impairments that in the absence of these laws would enable others to decide on their
behalf. Supported decision-making is meant to decrease use of guardianship and
surrogate decisioning for persons with decisional impairments and facilitate the
agency and respect the self-determination of persons with disabilities that impair
cognition. Supported decision-making conceptualizes autonomy as relational in
nature.
To date, scholarship has neglected the convergence of supported decision-
making and PAID laws, both of which prioritize autonomous decision-making.
PAID laws exclude persons with decisional impairments because the laws aim to
respect autonomy, but this exclusion assumes that persons with decisional
6. See infra Section J.A.2.
7. Advance directives are executed prior to the onset of decisional impairments
and provide healthcare instructions to be followed should a person be unable to make their
own decisions in the future. See generally UNIFORM HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT (UNIF.
LAW COMM'N 1993) [hereinafter UHCDA] (describing advance directives).
8. See generally Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal Briefing: New Penalties for
Disregarding Advance Directives and Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders, 28 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 74
(2017).
9. See, e.g., Eliana J. Theodorou, Supported Decision-Making in the Lone-Star
State, 93 N.Y.U. L. REv. 973, 998-1004 (2018) (discussing how disability advocates in Texas
created a coalition in support of supported decision-making).
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impairments are incapable of autonomous decision-making. The option of supported
decision-making combined with understanding autonomy as relational troubles this
assumption, however. If a person with decisional impairments can decide
autonomously-intentionally, voluntarily, and with understanding-when they are
assisted in decision-making, it is not obvious that such persons should be excluded
from PAID.
This Article is the first to consider whether terminally ill persons with
decisional impairments that would otherwise render them ineligible for PAID can
and should be able to access this end-of-life option if they use supported decision-
making to do so. Given that both PAID and supported decision-making laws are
increasingly being adopted into state legislation, it is important to address these
legal, ethical, and theoretical questions.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I first describes PAID laws and the
problematic proposals to expand access to PAID through use of advance directives.
Part I then describes supported ecision-making laws. Part II explores the question
of whether terminally ill supported persons with decisional impairments should be
able to hasten death through PAID. Part II first explores whether choosing PAID is
consistent with autonomous decision-making for this population. After concluding
that it is possible for some terminally ill persons with decisional impairments to
autonomously choose this end-of-life option, Part II argues that the principle of
equality demands that the law not exclude terminally ill supported persons with
decisional impairments from PAID when this option is available to similarly situated
individuals. Part III focuses on how PAID and supported decision-makings laws
interact in the District of Columbia, the only U.S. jurisdiction with both types of
laws. Presently, in the District of Columbia, it may be possible for a terminally ill
person with a decisional impairment that may otherwise make them ineligible for
PAID to choose this end-of-life option with the assistance of a supporter. Part IV
analyzes the existing safeguards in PAID and supported decision-making laws to
assess whether there is an appropriate balance between respecting the autonomy of
terminally ill persons with decisional impairments while also ensuring they are
protected from abuse. The Article concludes by arguing that supported decision-
making is a superior means for terminally ill persons with decisional impairments
to access PAID compared to advance directives.
I. LEGAL CONTEXT
This Part describes end-of-life decision-making and supported decision-
making laws to provide a foundation for understanding their interaction. First this
Part will describe PAID laws. Then it will describe the process of advance planning
for healthcare decision-making upon future loss of capacity, along with current
proposals to use advance directives to access PAID. Finally, this Part will describe
supported decision-making laws in the United States.
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
A. Autonomy and the Right to Die
The common law and constitutional rights to refuse life-sustaining and life-
saving medical treatments are based on respect for autonomy,10 a principle which is
foundational to U.S. law." Courts grappling with the contours of the right to refuse
medical treatment, which can be considered a limited right to die, have discussed it
in terms of liberty, dignity, privacy, bodily integrity, and self-determination' 2 -all
terms that are synonyms for, or components of, autonomy.
The right to refuse medical treatment, including the provision of artificial
nutrition and hydration,13 survives loss of decisional capacity. 14 The law allows for
people to make future decisions about their medical treatment and end-of-life wishes
through a process known as advance care planning. Advance care planning can
include appointing a healthcare agent; completing a living will with written
instructions about what an individual wants in the event of various medical scenarios
or how others should make decisions on their behalf; discussing one's wishes or
preferences with loved ones; or completing various medical orders such as a
Physician's Order for Life-Sustaining Treatment.15 Advance care planning is meant
to ensure that an individual's healthcare decision-making autonomy is respected
throughout their life, even when they lack decision-making capacity, but it tends to
privilege precedent rather than contemporaneous autonomy.
Not everyone who may wish to hasten death is dependent upon life-
sustaining treatment such as artificial nutrition and hydration, meaning that although
such persons have the legal right to refuse medical treatment, they are not in a
position to exercise it and subsequently die, no matter how strong their autonomy
interests in the time, manner, and setting of their death may be. Right-to-die
advocates thus attempted to establish a constitutional right to hasten death with
physician assistance for terminally ill persons who wanted to avoid a prolonged
death in a hospital or long-term care facility, framing this preference in terms of
respect for autonomy and dignity and as a natural extension of the right to refuse
medical treatment.16
10. Megan S. Wright, End of Life and Autonomy: The Case for Relational Nudges
in End-of-Life Decision-Making Law and Policy, 77 MD. L. REv. 1062, 1064-65 (2018)
(describing source of rights).
11. See generally Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological
Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REv. 1705 (1992).
12. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 10, at 1069-72 (describing court cases
establishing this right).
13. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) ("But for the
purposes of this case, we assume that the United States Constitution would grant a competent
person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.").
14. See UHCDA, supra note 7.
15. See Wright, supra note 10, at 1072-73 (describing advance care planning).
16. Brief of Respondents, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No.
96-110), 1996 WL 708925, at *10-28.
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But advocates were unsuccessful in this endeavor." Instead, the Supreme
Court delineated the bounds of individual autonomy interests in hastening death
relative to state interests in promoting life, preventing suicide, maintaining the
integrity of the medical profession, protecting vulnerable groups, and preventing
harm to third parties.18
Several state governments have been sympathetic to autonomy-based
arguments about PAID, 19 however, adopting this end-of-life option into state
legislation. Public support for this end-of-life option is also high,20 and although few
people die with PAID, those who do report that their reasons for so doing are related
to autonomy and dignity concerns.21 The following Section describes PAID laws in
the United States before considering proposals to expand access to PAID through
the use of advance directives.
1. Physician Aid in Dying
PAID, which was first legalized in Oregon in the mid-1990s,22 has in recent
years gained significant support across the country.23 Advocates for legalization of
this end-of-life option have successfully convinced legislators and voters that
terminally ill, competent adult patients should have the right to "die with dignity,"
which for some patients may include physician assistance in hastening their death.24
17. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735 (holding that there is no right to PAID under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 797 (1997)
(holding that there is no right to PAID under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
18. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728-35.
19. See, e.g., Patrick McGreevy, After Struggling, Jerry Brown Makes Assisted
Suicide Legal in California, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015) (reporting that Governor Brown's
statement upon signing the California End of Life Option Act into law was "I do not know
what I would do if I were dying in prolonged and excruciating pain. I am certain, however,
that it would be a comfort to be able to consider the options afforded by this bill. And I
wouldn't deny that right to others.").
20. Brenan, supra note 2.
21. Luai Al Rabadi et al., Trends in Medical Aid in Dying in Oregon and
Washington, JAMA NETWORK OPEN, Aug. 9, 2019, at 1 (reporting results of a study that found
that loss of autonomy was the most common reason for choosing PAID in Oregon and
Washington).
22. Death with Dignity Act, OR. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.800-.897 (West,
Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.).
23. See Brenan, supra note 2 (describing upward trend of support from the mid-
1990s to present).
24. For patients who elect PAID in Oregon, over 90% say that they are concerned
about loss of autonomy at the end of life, and two-thirds say they are concerned about loss of
dignity. OR. HEALTH AUTH., PUB. HEALTH Div., OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT 2018
DATA SUMMARY 6, 12 (2019), https://www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/PROVIDERPARTNERR
ESOURCES/EVALUATIONRESEARCH/DEATHWITHDIGNITYACT/Documents/year2
1.pdf; see also Al Rabadi et al., supra note 21; Madeline Li et al., Medical Assistance in
Dying Implementing a Hospital-Based Program in Canada, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2082
(2017) (reporting that the most common reason for requesting medical assistance in dying 
Canada is loss of autonomy).
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Washington legalized PAID in 2009,25 followed by Vermont in 2013,26 and Montana
decriminalized PAID in 2009.27 Since 2015, California,28 Colorado,29 the District of
Columbia,30 Hawaii," Maine,3 2 and New Jersey3 3 have legalized PAID. Other states
are currently considering PAID legislation.34
PAID legislation in the United States is typically modeled after Oregon's
Death with Dignity Act. 35 To be eligible for this end-of-life option, a patient must
be a terminally ill 36 adult3 7 who is a resident of a jurisdiction that has legalized this
practice.38 The patient must make multiple, voluntary requests to their physician,
both oral and written, with the oral requests at least 15 days apart.39 Patients must
25. Death with Dignity Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.245.010-.901 (West,
Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.).
26. Patient Choice at End of Life, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5281-5293 (West,
Westlaw through 2020 Gen. Assemb.).
27. Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1221-22 (Mont. 2009) (holding that physician-
assisted suicide is not contrary to Montana public policy, although this end-of-life option is
not a state constitutional right).
28. End of Life Option Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 443.1-.22 (West,
Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.).
29. End-of-Life Options Act, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-48-101 to -123 (West,
Westlaw through 2020 Extraordinary Sess.).
30. Death with Dignity, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7-661.01-.16 (West, Westlaw
through Dec. 3, 2020).
31. Our Care, Our Choice Act, HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 327L-1 to -25 (West,
Westlaw through end of 2020 Reg. Sess.).
32. Death with Dignity Act, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2140 (West, Westlaw
through 2019 Second Reg. Sess. of 129th Leg.).
33. Aid in Dying for the Terminally Ill Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:16-1 to -20
(West, Westlaw through 2020).
34. See In Your State, COMPASSION & CHOICES, https://compassionandchoi
ces.org/take-action/in-your-state (last visited Oct. 22, 2020) (mapping current PAID
legislative activity).
35. There are minor variations in state PAID laws. For example, Hawaii requires
a 20-day waiting period between oral requests, in contrast to the typical 15-day waiting
period. HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 327L-2 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.).
36. OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 127.805(1) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.).
Terminal illness is defined as a prognosis of death occurring within six months due to an
incurable disease. § 127.800(12). The terminal illness requirement differs from other
jurisdictions such as Belgium and the Netherlands where persons hastening death with
physician assistance need only have unbearable suffering with no prospect of improvement.




39. § 127.840. Additionally, the written form is provided by statute and must be
witnessed. § 127.810. The time delay provides a cooling-off period to ensure that this option
is truly what the patient wants. A patient may lose capacity or die during the waiting period,
however. Li, supra note 24, at 2085 (describing how this is not uncommon in Canada, which
has a 10-day "reflection" period). Oregon is in the process of amending its law to drop the
15-day requirement if a person is expected to die within that time frame.
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also be able to self-administer the medication,40 making this end-of-life option
distinct from other countries, such as the Netherlands and Canada, which permit
physicians to administer the medication to patients; i.e., PAID is distinct from
euthanasia.41
PAID laws also impose many requirements on participating physicians.42
For example, physicians must certify that their patient is terminally ill and is making
the request for PAID voluntarily.43 Physicians must also inform their patients about
the risks and benefits of and alternatives to PAID, 44 and refer them to counseling to
treat mental health issues, if appropriate.45 There are also state reporting
requirements.46
Most importantly for the purposes of this Article, physicians must also
determine that their patient has contemporaneous decision-making capacity.47
Generally, assessing decisional capacity requires a "professional clinical judgment
as to whether a specific individual has the requisite cognitive, decisional, affective,
and practical abilities to be judged to have the ability to complete a specific
task ... or make a specific decision."48 As part of this capacity assessment,
40. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.880 ("Nothing in ORS 127.800 to 127.897 shall
be construed to authorize a physician or any other person to end a patient's life by lethal
injection, mercy killing or active euthanasia.").
41. In such countries, when given a choice between self-administration and
physician-administration, patients overwhelmingly choose euthanasia. See, e.g., HEALTH
CANADA, supra note 3, at 5.
42. Physicians can opt out of participating in PAID, as can healthcare
organizations. OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 127.885.
43. § 127.815.
44. Id.
45. § 127.825. Researchers have found that in Oregon and Washington, 4% of
patients requesting PAID have received psychiatric referrals. Al Rabadi et al., supra note 21.
46. OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 127.865.
47. § 127.815. Oregon's statute uses the word "capable," which means that "in the
opinion of a court or in the opinion of the patient's attending physician or consulting
physician, psychiatrist or psychologist, a patient has the ability to make and communicate
health care decisions to health care providers, including communication through persons
familiar with the patient's manner of communicating if those persons are available."
§ 127.800(3).
It is unknown how often formal capacity assessments for patients seeking
PAID are conducted. Some gerontologists have noted that capacity assessments tend to be
informal, however. Jennifer Moye & Daniel C. Marson, Assessment of Decision-Making
Capacity in Older Adults: An Emerging Area of Practice and Research, 62 J. GERONTOLOGY
P3, P3 (2007). Additionally, studies of euthanasia in the Netherlands have found that
physicians are not formally evaluating the capacity of incompetent patients who are
euthanized, even though several patients had psychotic disorders. Samuel N. Doernberg et
al., Capacity Evaluations of Psychiatric Patients Requesting Assisted Death in the
Netherlands, 57 PSYCHOSOMATICS 556, 559 (2016).
48. Jennifer Moye & Michelle Braun, Assessment of Capacity, in HANDBOOK OF
ASSESSMENT IN CLINICAL GERONTOLOGY 581, 581 (Peter A. Lichtenberg ed., 2d ed. 2010).
Note that the assessment is with respect to a specific task or decision. Linda Ganzini et al.,
Pitfalls of Assessment of Decision-Making Capacity, 44 PSYCHOSOMATICS 237, 241 (2003).
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 63:157
healthcare professionals evaluate a patient's ability to understand medical
information and appreciate its significance, reason about the risks and benefits of
various treatment options, and communicate a choice.49
2. Physician Aid in Dying and Advance Directives
Current PAID statutes exclude many persons from accessing PAID.
Persons who are seriously and chronically but not terminally ill, or persons who
have impaired decision-making capacity because of dementia, for example, may
desire to die with physician assistance but be unable to do so given existing
eligibility requirements.50 This Article does not argue that the terminal illness
A person thus may have capacity for some tasks and decisions, but not others. For example,
someone may struggle to make financial decisions, but be fully capable of deciding whether
they wish to undergo a particular medical treatment.
49. UHCDA, supra note 7, § 1(3) ("'Capacity' means an individual's ability to
understand the significant benefits, risks, and alternatives to proposed health care and to make
and communicate a health-care decision."); Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Assessing
Patients' Capacities to Consent o Treatment, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1635, 1635 (1988)
(defining capacity as "communicating a choice, understanding relevant information,
appreciating the current situation and its consequences, and manipulating information
rationally"); Doernberg et al, supra note 47, at 557 ("Decisional competence means that the
patient is able to understand relevant information about his situation and prognosis, consider
any alternatives and assess the implications of his decision."); Moye & Braun, supra note 48,
at 585-86.
There are known problems with both the validity and reliability of formal
capacity assessments because determinations of capacity depend upon the criteria used and
the value judgments of the healthcare professional conducting the assessment. Doernberg et
al., supra note 47, at 557; Ganzini et al., supra note 48, at 241. This leads to different
physicians coming to different conclusions about a patient's capacity. Doernberg et al., supra
note 47, at 560 (describing results of a study where physicians disagreed about the capacity
of a patient requesting euthanasia in the Netherlands in 12% of cases); Moye & Marson, supra
note 47, at P7; see also Rebecca Dresser, Autonomy and Its Limits in End-of-Life Law, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 399, 402 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2017)
(describing how patients may mistakenly be determined to lack decisional capacity when they
are actually afraid, upset, or have difficulty communicating); Irene Tuffrey-Wijne et al.,
Euthanasia nd Assisted Suicide for People with an Intellectual Disability and/or Autism
Spectrum Disorder: An Examination of Nine Relevant Euthanasia Cases in the Netherlands
(2012-2016), 19 BMC MED. ETHICS 17, 19 (2018) (noting that capacity assessments do not
appropriately weigh other factors such as emotions and social context, and arguing that only
professionals experienced with patients with developmental and intellectual disabilities
should conduct capacity assessments of this patient population). Additionally, capacity may
only be assessed upon disagreement with a healthcare provider's recommendation, raising
questions about the assessment's purpose. Ganzini et al., supra note 48, at 238, 241. Finally,
requiring a patient to tell others about their reasons for their decisions is arguably
incompatible with respect for patient autonomy, given the imposition on the patient's privacy.
50. See Orentlicher et al., supra note 1, at 1961-62 (explaining that the terminal
illness requirement is intentional and that PAID is meant only for those who have no other
option in the face of "suffering from irreversible and severe illness").
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requirement for PAID should be rescinded;5 1 instead, it focuses on the
contemporaneous decisional capacity requirement.
There have been proposals to allow access to PAID through advance
directives, so that if persons desiring PAID lose decision-making capacity, they are
still able to hasten their death in this manner once they are otherwise eligible, e.g.,
upon becoming terminally ill. 52 There are many problems with advance directives,
however, which likely will also occur in the PAID context.5 3
Most importantly, it is often impossible to predict what medical or end-of-
life circumstances one will face in the future and what one's treatment preferences
will be when one faces an illness or injury.54 It is also quite possible that an
individual's preferences will change over time, especially as they adapt to disability
and illness.55 But if an individual has completed an advance directive based on
earlier preferences and has since acquired a decision-making impairment, they may
be bound by past preferences that they no longer have or may not even remember;
i.e., advance directives create lock-in.56 If an advance directive for PAID was a legal
possibility, a terminally ill person with moderate dementia who has a good quality
of life may have completed an advance directive for PAID on the assumption that
51. See Leslie Pickering Francis, Assisted Suicide: Are the Elderly a Special
Case?, in PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE: EXPANDING THE DEBATE 75, 75 (Margaret P. Battin
et al. eds., 1998) (arguing that a terminal illness should be a PAID requirement).
52. See generally Paul T. Menzel & Bonnie Steinbock, Advance Directives,
Dementia, and Physician-Assisted Death, 41 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 484 (2013). Such advance
directives for euthanasia are legal in the Netherlands. See generally David Gibbes Miller et
al., Advance Euthanasia Directives: A Controversial Case and Its Ethical Implications, 45 J.
MED. ETHICS 84 (2019).
Other proposals for hastening death in the absence of a terminal illness and
upon loss of decisional capacity include advance directives declining food and water. See
generally Paul T. Menzel & M. Colette Chandler-Cramer, Advance Directives, Dementia, and
Withholding Food and Water by Mouth, 44 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 23 (May-June 2014).
53. One significant issue is that most persons never complete an advance directive,
meaning this proposal will likely not have a significant effect on expanded access to PAID
for persons who otherwise would not complete an advance directive. See generally Kuldeep
N. Yadav et al., Approximately One in Three U.S. Adults Completes Any Type of Advance
Directive for End-of-Life Care, 36 HEALTH AFF. 1244 (2017). For persons who are
considering an advance directive for PAID, however, noncompletion is not a problem.
54. See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, Precommitment: A Misguided Strategy for
Securing Death with Dignity, 81 TEX. L. REv. 1823, 1829-37 (2003) (describing problems
with precommitment).
55. People routinely rate the quality of life of persons with disabilities lower than
persons with disabilities rate their own quality of life. Additionally, when imagining a future
with disability, people estimate that their quality of life will be low, but when they later
acquire a disability, they often adapt and have a higher quality of life than they anticipated.
Gary L. Albrecht & Patrick J. Devlieger, The Disability Paradox: High Quality of Life Against
All Odds, 48 SoC. SCI. & MED. 977 (1999).
There is also research that demonstrates that people do change their minds
about receiving medical assistance in dying, even after they have been successful in receiving
approval to die in this manner. See, e.g., Li, supra note 24, at 2085 (discussing how some
Canadians who were approved for medical assistance in dying changed their mind).
56. Dresser, supra note 54.
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her quality of life under these circumstances would be poor; she may no longer
remember her prior preferences or wish to use PAID.57
Additionally, in some cases, it may be difficult to interpret a living will,
which makes attempting to honor an incapacitated patient's wishes more difficult. 58
There are also reports that advance directives are sometimes disregarded by
healthcare providers.59 These issues raise questions about whether advance
directives for PAID will have the intended effect of respecting patient autonomy,
despite loss of decision-making capacity, in end-of-life decision-making.60
Finally, advance directives would only expand access to PAID for persons
who previously had the decisional capacity required to execute the directive, e.g., a
person with typical cognitive abilities who executed an advance directive prior to
the onset of dementia. Other persons with lifelong cognitive impairments may also
have autonomy and dignitary interests in accessing PAID. But a PAID advance
directive would not be an option for this population.
As the next Section explains, there are legal alternatives to advance
directives that can account for current preferences and allow persons with most types
of decisional impairments to make whatever healthcare or end-of-life decisions they
prefer at the time each decision needs to be made.
B. Autonomy and Supported Decision-Making
The previous Section illustrated how end-of-life law has been shaped by
autonomy concerns, and such concerns have also been important to the disability
community. Disability advocates have emphasized the importance of respect for the
autonomy of persons with disabilities, in part to counter stereotypes of persons with
disabilities, particularly cognitive disabilities, as dependent on others and incapable
57. There is the additional problem that sometimes it may seem as if the person
with decisional impairments for whom an end-of-life decision is being made is not the same
person who wrote the advance directive, which raises questions about the moral authority of
the advance directive. This is known as the problem of personal identity, which often arises
in the case of persons who acquire dementia and may experience personality change or such
profound memory loss that they are no longer recognizable as the person they once were.
Megan S. Wright, Dementia, Autonomy, and Supported Healthcare Decision Making, 79 MD.
L. REv. 257, 314-19 (2020).
58. See generally, e.g., Ferdinando L. Mirarchi et al., TRIAD-I-The Realistic
Interpretation of Advanced Directives, 4 J. PATIENT SAFETY 235 (2008) (describing issues
with interpreting common terms on advance directives as well as results of original study
demonstrating interpretive problems).
59. See, e.g., State Fines St. Petersburg Nursing Home for Violating Residents'
Do-Not-Resuscitate Order, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 4, 2014); Pope, supra note 8.
60. An important argument that advance directives may do a better job than the
current, contemporaneous-capacity requirement in PAID does promoting patient autonomy
at the end of life reflects the reality that some p rsons who qualify for PAID may hasten their
death earlier than they desire because they fear losing capacity before they will be able to
self-administer the medication. See Li, supra note 24, at 2087-88 (describing how some
Canadians elect medical assistance in dying earlier than they prefer because they fear that if
they wait, they will lose the ability to give informed consent, thus becoming ineligible for this
end-of-life option).
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of autonomy.6 1 Indeed, the findings section of the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), the most important piece of civil-rights legislation for persons with
disabilities, expressly discusses the autonomy concerns of persons with
disabilities.62 Autonomy is not only a dignitary good-i.e., respect for autonomy
reflects respect for persons-but it is also linked to increased wellbeing.63
An important component of autonomy is the freedom to make one's own
decisions. Advocates for persons with developmental and intellectual disabilities
thus have been pushing for use of supported decision-making in order to respect the
autonomy and personhood, and promote the wellbeing, of individuals with
disabilities.64 Fundamental to the philosophy of supported decision-making is that
everyone should have equal legal capacity or equal power to exercise legal rights,65
an ideal found in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 66 The
61. See, e.g., Harlan Hahn, Disputing the Doctrine of Benign Neglect: A Challenge
to the Disparate Treatment ofAmericans with Disabilities, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES:
EXPLORING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 269, 271
(Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000) ("Having to rely on others to secure
one's . . . needs is . . . characteristic of being subjected to paternalism. Dependence ...
prevents members of a disadvantaged group from achieving self-determination .... ").
Prior scholarship has argued that persons with decisional impairments are
capable of exercising autonomy if autonomy is conceptualized appropriately. See generally,
e.g., Agnieszka Jaworska, Respecting the Margins of Agency: Alzheimer's Patients and the
Capacity to Value, 28 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105 (1999) (defining autonomy as the capacity to
value); Wright, supra note 57 (defining autonomy as relational agency).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2018) ("[T]he Nation's proper goals regarding
individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation,
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals.").
63. Jaworska, supra note 61, at 109; Melanie H. Mallers et al., Perceived Control
in the Lives of Older Adults: The Influence of Langer and Rodin's Work on Gerontological
Theory, Policy, and Practice, 54 GERONTOLOGIST 67, 68-69 (2014); Winick, supra note 11.
Indeed, the PAID option "provides important psychological benefits for the terminally ill
because it gives the terminally ill autonomy, control, and choice .... " Patients' Rights to
Self-Determination at the End of Life, AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS'N (Oct. 28, 2008),
https://www.apha.org/policies-and-advocacy/public-health-policy-statements/policy-
database/2014/07/29/13/28/patients-rights-to-self-determination-at-the-end-of-life.
64. See Theodorou, supra note 9, at 982-86.
65. See Lucy Series & Anna Nilsson, Article 12 CRPD: Equal Protection before
the Law, in THE UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: A
COMMENTARY 2 (Ilias Bantekas et al. eds., 2018) ("The right to equal recognition before the
law is concerned with legal personality - the ability to bear rights and duties under law, and
legal capacity - whether and how one can exercise, claim or defend those rights, and the
assumption of legal liability."); see also KARRIE A. SHOGREN ET AL., SUPPORTED DECISION-
MAKING: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE TO ENHANCE SELF-DETERMINATION AND
QUALITY OF LIFE 123-24 (2019) (discussing plenary guardianship, which gives such power
to others); Moye & Braun, supra note 48, at 583-85 (describing how legal capacity is
something determined by judges, often in guardianship proceedings, or by lawyers, but that
the term is vague and often defined in the negative).
66. G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106, Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), art. 12 (Dec. 13, 2006) ("States parties shall recognize that
persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of
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common practice of using the law to remove decision-making authority from a
person with decisional impairments and to give this authority to a guardian or a
family member67 conflicts with the principle of equal legal capacity.
Supported decision-making provides an alternative to surrogate decision-
making and guardianship.68 Under this model, persons with cognitive impairments
can choose to enter into agreements with others, known as supporters, whose role is
to assist the person with the disability in making decisions about matters such as
where to live, how to manage finances and property, where to go to school, and what
medical treatment to choose, among other matters. Instead of deciding for the person
with a disability, the supporter assists in information gathering, thinking through
options, or communicating decisions to others.69 This decision-making model can
be informally used or can be memorialized in a formal, written agreement.70
Supported decision-making legislation that recognizes and facilitates use
of formal supported decision-making agreements began spreading across the
country around the same time that PAID legislation did. In 2015, Texas became the
first state to formalize supported decision-making in law,7 1 and it was followed by
Delaware,72 Wisconsin,73 the District of Columbia,74 Indiana,7 5 Alaska,76 Nevada,77
Rhode Island,78 and North Dakota.79
One purpose of adopting this legislation is to ensure that "[a]ll adults [are]
able to live in the manner they wish and to accept or refuse support, assistance, or
life."). See generally Robert Dinerstein, Implementing Legal Capacity Under Article 12 of
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The Difficult Road from
Guardianship to Supported Decision-Making, 19 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 8 (2012).
67. See, e.g., UHCDA, supra note 7, § 5(a) ("A surrogate may make a health-care
decision for a patient who is an adult or emancipated minor if the patient has been determined
by the primary physician to lack capacity and no agent or guardian has been appointed or the
agent or guardian is not reasonably available.").
68. SHOGREN ET AL., supra note 65, at 138.
69. See Wright, supra note 57, at 286-95 (providing detailed overview of
supported decision-making laws in the United States).
70. Nina A. Kohn et al., Supported Decision Making: A Viable Alternative to
Guardianship?, 117 PA. ST. L. REv. 1111, 1121 (2013) (describing different models of
supported decision-making).
71. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 1357.001-.102 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg.
Sess.).
72. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § § 9401(a)-9410(a) (West, Westlaw through ch. 292
of 150th Gen. Assemb. 2020).
73. WiS. STAT. ANN. §§ 52.01-.32 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 186).
74. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7-2131 to -2134 (West, Westlaw through Dec. 3, 2020).
75. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 29-3-14-1 to -13 (West 2019).
76. ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 13.56.010-.195 (West, Westlaw through ch. 32 of
2020 Reg. Sess.).
77. NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 162c.010-.330 (West, Westlaw through 32nd
Special Sess.).
78. 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 66.13-1 to -10 (West, Westlaw though ch. 79 of the
2020 2d Reg. Sess.).
79. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 30.1-36-01 to -08 (West, Westlaw through 2019
Reg. Sess.).
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protection as long as they do not harm others and are capable of making decisions
about those matters."80 Accordingly, in several states, a person with a cognitive
impairment is able to act independently of the agreement,81 while at the same time,
third parties, including healthcare professionals, are instructed to rely on the
supported decision-making agreement.82 There are also corresponding limits to
liability for good faith reliance on the agreement. 83
To protect against abuse, neglect, or exploitation of persons with cognitive
disabilities, supported decision-making legislation contains safeguards. Such
safeguards include prohibiting some persons from acting as supporters, such as those
who have committed certain types of crimes;84 limiting the scope of a supporter's
authority;85 and advising third parties to contact the state agency responsible for
ensuring the welfare of older persons or persons with disabilities if they suspect
abuse or neglect of the person with a disability.86
Although research is sparse on the use of supported decision-making,87
scholars have been calling for its application beyond persons with developmental
and intellectual disabilities to include, for example, persons with mental illness,88
severe brain injury,89 and dementia,90 as well as older adults.91 Scholars have also
argued that for persons with acquired disabilities, supported decision-making is
preferable to reliance on advance directives because this decision-making model can
account for changed preferences, avoiding the issue of lock-in that advance
directives create.92
80. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9402A(b)(1)-(4) (West, Westlaw though ch. 292 of
the 150th Gen. Assemb.). Another purpose, at least in some states that have adopted this
legislation, is to save costs associated with decreased use of guardianship for aging adults.
Theodorou, supra note 9, at 1006.
81. Wright, supra note 57, at 287.
82. Id. at 293.
83. Id. at 293-94.
84. Id. at 287-88.
85. Id. at 289-90.
86. Id. at 290-92, 294.
87. Kohn et al., supra note 70. For a review of research, see SHOGREN ET AL., supra
note 65; Karrie A. Shogren et al., Supported Decision Making: A Synthesis of the Literature
Across Intellectual Disability, Mental Health, and Aging, 52 EDUC. & T RAINING AUTISM &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 144 (2017).
88. See, e.g., Dilip V. Jeste et al., Supported Decision Making in Serious Mental
Illness, 81 PSYCHIATRY: INTERPERSONAL & BIOLOGICAL PROCESSES 28 (2018).
89. See, e.g., Tamar Ezer, Megan S. Wright & Joseph J. Fins, The Neglect of
Persons with Severe Brain Injury in the United States: An International Human Rights
Analysis, 22 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. 265, 272-73 (2020).
90. See generally Wright, supra note 57; Megan S. Wright, Dementia, Healthcare
Decision Making, and Disability Law, 47 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 25 (2019); Megan S. Wright,
Dementia, Cognitive Transformation, and Supported Decision Making, 20 AM. J. BIOETHICS
88 (2020).
91. Rebekah Diller, Legal Capacity for All: Including Older Persons in the Shift
from Adult Guardianship to Supported Decision-Making, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495 (2016).
92. Wright, supra note 57, at 314-17.
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A question that has not yet been addressed by scholars, legislators, or
judges is how PAID and supported decision-making laws interact. As noted
previously, under current PAID laws, contemporaneous decision-making capacity
is required for patients to be eligible to hasten their death in this manner. This
requirement assumes that one could be deemed to lack capacity. But this assumption
conflicts with supported decision-making legislation that asserts that persons who
enter into these agreements retain legal capacity and can make decisions about their
lives despite the presence of decisional impairments.93
The remainder of this Article examines the interaction of supported
decision-making and PAID laws. The following Part focuses on the normative
question of whether terminally ill supported persons with decisional impairments
should be eligible for PAID. Given that one important purpose of both laws is to
promote autonomy, and given the importance of equal treatment under the law for
persons with disabilities, I argue that persons with decisional impairments should
not be denied access to PAID if they wish to end their lives in this manner and meet
all other PAID eligibility requirements.
II. EQUALITY OF AUTONOMY: PHYSICIAN AID IN DYING FOR
TERMINALLY ILL SUPPORTED PERSONS
Should the law permit terminally ill supported persons with decisional
impairments to hasten death with PAID? Assessing the normative foundations for
PAID and supported decision-making laws provides insight. Both sets of laws are
meant to respect and promote autonomy; it is thus imperative to analyze whether
this end is achieved at their intersection.
This Part first analyzes whether a supported person with decisional
impairments seeking PAID can meet the requirements for autonomous decision-
making once they become terminally ill (rather than via advance directive). After
concluding that this contemporaneous choice can be autonomous, this Part argues
that the principle of equality demands that the law not exclude terminally ill
supported persons with decisional impairments from this end-of-life option.
A. Autonomy at the Intersection of Supported Decision-Making and Physician
Aid in Dying
If the goal of both PAID and supported decision-making laws is to respect
and promote autonomy, then it is necessary to ask whether a terminally ill supported
person with a decisional impairment can autonomously elect to hasten death through
93. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.56.150(b) (West 2018) ("An adult who
enters into a supported decision-making agreement may act without the decision-making
assistance of the supporter."); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-3-14-4(c) (West 2019) ("The existence
of an executed supported decision making a reement does not preclude the adult from acting
independently of the supported decision making agreement.").
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PAID; that is, whether they can decide with intent and understanding and without
control or undue influence being exercised upon them.94
Some may assert that it is not possible for persons with some types of
cognitive disabilities to ever be contemporaneously autonomous.95 At the extreme
end of cognitive disability, this is indeed true. For example, if someone is in a
chronic vegetative state where they lack awareness,96 they will not be able to make
their own decisions. But in many other cases, despite decisional impairments, a
person will be able to communicate preferences and act autonomously in relation to
others, making them capable of autonomy as defined by feminist- and disability-
studies scholars.97
Indeed, my prior scholarship has argued for a more accurate understanding
of autonomy, one that accords with the realities of decision-making, in healthcare
decision-making law.98 Research has demonstrated that many persons, regardless of
disability status, prefer to make serious and late-life healthcare decisions
relationally-in consultation or collaboration with others and perhaps after
accounting for others' interests-and still view themselves as deciding
autonomously.99 Further, empirical studies have shown that many persons struggle
to make healthcare decisions that further their interests because of cognitive biases,
limited options, power imbalances, and difficulty understanding complex medical
information.100 I have thus argued that autonomous decision-making in the
healthcare context is better described as relational agency and that through supported
decision-making, autonomy so conceptualized can be exercised by persons with
cognitive impairments such as mild to moderate dementia.101 With this
understanding of autonomy, the exclusion of persons with decisional impairments
from PAID is problematic.
94. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 104 (7th ed. 2013).
95. Anita Silvers, Protecting the Innocents from Physician-Assisted Suicide:
Disability Discrimination and the Duty to Protect Vulnerable Groups, in PHYSICIAN-
ASSISTED SUICIDE: EXPANDING THE DEBATE 133, 138-39 (Margaret P. Battin et al. eds., 1998)
(" [T]he principle of self-determination itself rules out individuals with dementia, retardation,
or other impairments that substantially limit their relevant cognitive functioning from being
assisted in suicide.").
96. See generally Sunil Kothari, Chronic Disorders of Consciousness, in
NEUROPALLIATIVE CARE 37 (Claire J. Creutzfeldt et al. eds., 2018).
97. See generally RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON
AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds.,
2000); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAw'S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF, AUTONOMY,
AND LAw 3 (2011); Harold Braswell, Can There Be a Disability Studies Theory of "End-of-
Life Autonomy"?, 31 DISABILITY STUD. Q. (2011).
98. Wright, supra note 10; Wright, supra note 57.
99. Wright, supra note 10, at 1082-93; Wright, supra note 57, at 272-74.
100. Wright, supra note 10, at 1096-101; Wright, supra note 57, at 279-80.
101. Wright, supra note 57. But see Margaret Isabel Hall, Dementia, Autonomy and
Guardianship for the Old, in THE LAw AND ETHICS OF DEMENTIA 339, 347-48 (Charles
Foster et al. eds., 2014) ("[N]o amount of support will render every individual capable of
making his or her 'own' decisions.").
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But the analysis of whether choosing to hasten death with PAID is an
autonomous decision may depend upon the supported person's type of cognitive
impairment. Determining whether end-of-life decision-making for supported
persons with decisional impairments can be contemporaneously autonomous may
differ based on whether someone was previously considered competent to make
their own decisions. 102 The next Subsections will analyze whether previously
capacitated and never capacitated persons with decisional impairments can, with or
without supported decision-making, satisfy baseline requirements for autonomous
decision-making when seeking to hasten death through PAID.
1. Intent
If a terminally ill supported person with a decisional impairment makes the
requests required for PAID, then the first requirement for autonomous decision-
making-intent-seems to be easily satisfied. As described previously, to use
PAID, a patient must make one written and two oral requests.0 3 Expressing a desire
to die to a healthcare provider likely is not a sufficient oral request. Rather, the
request must be for PAID as the manner of death. Making two such requests, along
with completing a signed and witnessed form making the same request, constitutes
102. It may be instructive to think about decision-making capacity with respect to
four categories of persons with cognitive impairments. Some persons with decisional
impairments may not have had previous cognitive disability and will not regain their cognitive
abilities because of the progressive nature of their disability, e.g., dementia; such acquired
disabilities may be disruptive to personal identity. Others may have had lifelong decisional
impairments, and the degree of their disability (and their identity) may remain relatively
constant throughout their life, e.g., Down Syndrome. In other cases, someone may have
impairment that fluctuates because of a disability, e.g., schizophrenia. Finally, some persons
may acquire a disability that impairs cognition, but could possibly regain function, e.g.,
traumatic brain injury. These are broad categories, but it is important to remember that there
will be significant variation in each category based on an individual's personal and social
characteristics.
This Article focuses on capacity and autonomy primarily with respect to the
first two categories of disability, especially given the terminal illness requirement for PAID.
With respect to fluctuating capacity, while there may not be sufficient time to restore capacity
through medical treatment given the terminal prognosis, for the purposes of analysis, because
the person has had capacity in the past, they can be considered similar to persons with an
acquired, progressive disability. If fluctuating capacity is due to being over-sedated, it may
be advised to reduce or discontinue the medication so the person can regain the ability to
make their own healthcare decisions. If fluctuating capacity is due instead to mental illness,
providers may attempt to treat the mental illness to try to restore capacity.
Given the short period of time to make a contemporaneous decision to use
PAID, i.e., six months or less, attempts to regain function from rehabilitation after, for
example, a stroke and then arranging for use of supported decision-making makes this
category of decisional impairment less relevant for the above analysis. The final category of
decisional impairments would be relevant to analyze a country that permits medically assisted
dying for persons who are not terminally ill and for persons with psychiatric disorders that
impair capacity, e.g., the Netherlands.
103. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 127.840 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg.
Sess.).
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intent,104 regardless of whether the requests are made with or without a supporter's
assistance. Whether a person previously had no decisional impairments, e.g., a
person who acquired dementia, or had a lifelong intellectual disability, e.g., Down
Syndrome, does not alter the analysis; in both cases, intent manifests.
2. Understanding
More difficult questions arise with respect to the second requirement for
autonomous decision-making-understanding. If a person has cognitive
impairments significant enough that in the absence of supported decision-making
they would be deemed incapacitated by physicians or a court, doubts may arise about
whether they are capable of understanding what they are choosing when they request
PAID, regardless of whether they receive decision-making support.
On a philosophical level, it may be impossible to know whether something
is understood. On a more practical level, however, the requirement of understanding
is difficult for all persons making medical and end-of-life decisions, as ample
scholarly literature has documented,105 so it is unclear why there should be higher
demands for understanding for persons with decisional impairments.106
Confidence about whether a person with a decisional impairment
understands PAID may depend on whether they acquired their cognitive impairment
or have had lifelong cognitive impairments. Perhaps evidence about the person's
prior ability to understand death and PAID, along with their years of experience
104. Indeed, the three request requirement is a much stricter standard for intent than
in other serious, and perhaps life-ending, healthcare decision-making contexts where some
empirical research has demonstrated that patients report not making any decisions about what
happens to them, despite many decisions having been made. Theresa S. Drought & Barbara
A. Koenig, "Choice" in End-of-Life Decision Making: Researching Fact or Fiction?, 42
GERONTOLOGIST 114, 121 (2002).
Further, other research as shown that patients who elect PAID make more
than three requests, make the requests forcefully, and refuse other healthcare interventions.
Linda Ganzini et al., Oregon Physicians' Perceptions of Patients Who Request Assisted
Suicide and Their Families, 6 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 381, 384 (2004). If terminally ill supported
persons with decisional impairments act similarly to individuals in this study, the case for
intent is even stronger.
105. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 10, at 1096-99 (explaining that people do not
understand medical decisions because the information is complex, their reasoning is flawed,
and they are often sick and scared at the time of the decision).
106. Some scholars have argued that the capacity requirements for PAID should be
heightened because it is serious and irrevocable. Francis, supra note 51, at 78; Tuffrey-Wijne
et al., supra note 49, at 14-17. Such arguments are based on the principle that the more serious
or risky the decision, the more evidence of competency to make the decision is required.
James F. Drane, Competency to Give an Informed Consent: A Model for Making Clinical
Assessments, 252 JAMA 925 (1984). It is not obvious why the decision to use PAID differs
from other serious end-of-life decisions such as having a DNR/DNI order or completing an
advance directive instructing refusal of life-sustaining or saving treatment. Additionally, these
arguments cannot justify treating persons with cognitive disabilities differently by requiring
them to meet a much higher standard for understanding than the standard required of all
others. Tuffrey-Wijne and her coauthors recognize this point, and so have argued for
heightened capacity requirements for all patients, arguing that equal treatment in this respect
will benefit everyone. Tuffrey-Wijne et al., supra note 49.
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making their own decisions, would make others more comfortable that the person
with decisional impairments understands their present request, particularly if that
request is consistent with their views on end of life prior to the onset of their
cognitive disability. In contrast, there may be less confidence that a person
understands PAID if that individual has had lifelong difficulty understanding
various medical treatments or concepts such as death, has had lifelong difficulty
engaging in causal inference, or has not had as much experience or skill in making
their own decisions.107 If a person with an intellectual or developmental disability
that impairs cognition had lengthy experience being supported in decision-making,
however, there may be reason to think that they are more adept at making and
understanding serious decisions with support than a person with an acquired
decisional impairment who may not be as experienced in receiving support to
increase their level of understanding.
But for the purposes of assessing understanding of PAID for patients with
cognitive impairments, if the patient can communicate (with or without support) that
they understand that choosing PAID will result in immediate death, and not using
PAID will keep them alive for some period of time until they die from their
underlying illness, this requirement of autonomous decision-making is likely met.
Indeed, unlike trying to understand complex medical interventions that may be used
to sustain life, e.g., various types of surgical interventions, it seems to be a relatively
low cognitive burden to understand that ingesting a drug will cause death. 108 For all
healthcare and end-of-life decisions, however, physicians should attempt to provide
their patients, with and without disabilities, information in an accessible manner 09
and fully communicate all alternatives to PAID.110
3. No Undue Influence or Coercion
The last requirement for autonomous decision-making-the absence of
coercion or undue influence-likely raises the most concerns that a terminally ill
107. See Tuffrey-Wijne et al., supra note 49 (discussing how in the Netherlands
physicians evaluate the consistency of their incapacitated patients' request for euthanasia for
insight into whether their patient understands what they are requesting, but arguing that this
is misguided and physicians should instead be assessing reasoning and appreciation).
108. It is possible, though, that a person will not understand what death is, in which
case they would evidence a lack of understanding what of PAID is, so choosing PAID would
not be an autonomous choice. Recent ethnographic research has demonstrated, however, that
some persons with moderate dementia in a locked dementia care unit engage in conversation
with nursing staff and other residents about who will be the next resident to die, indicating
the possibility of understanding death for some persons with moderate to severe decisional
impairments. Cindy L. Cain, Sacred Selves of People with Dementia: Interactional Orders
that Support and Undermine Personhood (Feb. 3, 2020) (on file with author). But see Norman
L. Cantor, The Relation between Autonomy-Based Rights and Profoundly Mentally Disabled
Persons, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 37, 49 (2004) ("[A] profoundly disabled person with the
mental function of a small child cannot grasp the concepts of a continued existence and death
necessary to form a judgment or preference regarding life-sustaining medical intervention.").
109. Tuffrey-Wijne, supra note 49, at 18.
110. This requirement is legally mandated. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 127.815(1)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.). Persons with cognitive
impairments may need their healthcare providers to spend more time discussing options,
however, before an informed decision can be made. Tuffrey-Wijne, supra note 49, at 18.
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supported person with decisional impairments choosing PAID would not be doing
so autonomously. Given the relative vulnerability of persons with disabilities
generally," and cognitive impairments specifically, there are serious concerns that
such persons may not be able to assert their preferences about the manner and time
of their death against their physicians', family members', and supporters'
preferences, thus experiencing undue influence that is inconsistent with
autonomy.12 Indeed, disability rights activists have long viewed PAID with
suspicion or hostility because they are concerned that the lives of patients with
disabilities are not valued,1 and thus patients with disabilities will be pressured by
111. When enacting the ADA, Congress drew attention to the vulnerable status of
persons with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6) (2018) ("[C]ensus data, national polls, and
other studies have documented that people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior
status in our society, and are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and
educationally.").
Scholars have also described various ways in which persons with disabilities
are vulnerable. As a group, persons with disabilities have lower levels of educational
attainment, lower incomes, and less political influence than persons without disabilities.
Andrew I. Batavia, Ten Years Later: The ADA and the Future of Disability Policy, in
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 61, at 283, 283; Jerome E. Bickenbach, The ADA v. the Canadian
Charter of Rights: Disability Rights and the Social Model of Disability, in AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS,
supra note 61, at 342, 352; Lennard J. Davis, Go to the Margins of the Class: Hate Crimes
and Disability, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR
INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 61, at 331, 332; Francis, supra note 51, at 80.
Persons with disabilities are also more socially isolated and victims of crime. Richard K.
Scotch, Making Change: The ADA as an Instrument of Social Reform, in AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS,
supra note 61, at 281, 281; Davis, supra, at 332; Francis, supra note 51, at 80. They also have
higher rates of depression and have to combat negative stereotypes and discrimination.
Francis, supra note 51, at 80; Scotch, supra, at 281.
It is important to remember, however, that just because a group of persons
tends to be more vulnerable, not all members of that group are vulnerable. BEAUCHAMP &
CHILDRESS, supra note 94, at 267-68. Additionally, even persons without decisional
impairments are likely to be vulnerable when they are terminally ill.
112. This vulnerability to coercion is not only with respect to death-hastening,
however. It may be the case that a person with decisional impairments truly wants to hasten
death with PAID, but their physicians and family members are opposed to it. Given their
impairments, they may be unable to find another physician willing to assist them with death
in this manner, or they may be unable to fight their family's efforts to keep them alive.
Furthermore, it is necessary to distinguish influence from undue influence.
When others influence an individual's decisions, this is not necessarily inconsistent with
autonomy. Wright, supra note 10. Indeed, persons without decisional impairments making
important late-life medical decisions often desire others to be involved in the decision-making
and may also account for others' interests when making decisions. Id. at 1081-94. It is not
clear why persons with cognitive disabilities should be prevented from similarly deciding.
113. See, e.g., Dan W. Brock, Health Care Resource Prioritization and
Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES:
EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 61, at
223; David Orentlicher, Utility, Equality and Health Care Needs of Persons with Disabilities:
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their doctors and families to end their lives; i.e., the legal right to die becomes a duty
for persons with disabilities to die, 14 or that patients' preferences for a hastened
death reflect a sense of being a burden on others.15
When the Supreme Court considered whether there was a constitutional
right to PAID, the Justices also expressed concerns about the compromised
autonomy of persons with disabilities who, in the Court's view, could be coerced
into hastening death with PAID.1 16 The Court noted, "'An insidious bias against the
handicapped . . . makes them especially in need of . .. statutory protection.' The
state's interest here goes beyond protecting the vulnerable from coercion; it extends
Interpreting the ADA's Requirement of Reasonable Accommodations, in AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS,
supra note 61, at 236 (discussing how the lives of persons with disabilities may literally be
worth less in a cost-effectiveness or quality-adjusted life years analysis); Mary Crossley,
Ending-Life Decisions: Some Disability Perspectives, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 893 (2017)
(summarizing the concerns of persons with disabilities about end-of-life decisions); Beth
Haller & Sue Ralph, Not Worth Keeping Alive? News Framing of Physician-Assisted Suicide
in the United States and Great Britain, 2 JOURNALISM STUD. 407, 415-16 (2001) (finding that
news articles covered PAID through the frame of "better dead than disabled").
114. See, e.g., Not Dead Yet Disability Activists Oppose Assisted Suicide as a
Deadly Form of Discrimination, NOT DEAD YET, http://notdeadyet.org/assisted-suicide-
talking-points (last visited Jan. 6, 2020) (arguing that physicians underestimate he quality of
life of persons with disabilities, which will lead physicians to assist with their patient's
suicide, and that family influence on the PAID decision constitutes elder abuse); NAT'L
COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, THE DANGER OF ASSISTED SUICIDE LAWS 11-12 (Oct. 9, 2019),
https://ncd.gov/sites/default/files/NCDAssistedSuicideReport_508.pdf.
Scholars have also summarized this view as follows:
[L]egalizing assisted dying by attempting to establish an absolute right to
bodily autonomy may undermine other individual and group rights,
and ... creating one class of people for whom life is expendable, that
particular view may be extended by society to all groups possessing such
attributes (such as permanently disabled people). They fear that there
would be a risk to the rights of such vulnerable groups in the form of
society being less willing to provide for their care and support.
Tuffrey-Wijne et al., supra note 49. See generally Crossley, supra note 113. A variation on
this argument is that because persons with disabilities are treated poorly by society, they will
be suicidal and thus more likely to want to hasten death, and that physicians will likewise
disregard the worth of the lives of their suicidal patients with disabilities and be more likely
to accede to PAID requests. Silvers, supra note 95, at 136.
115. Felicia Ackerman, Assisted Suicide, Terminal Illness, Severe Disability, and
the Double Standard, in PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE: EXPANDING THE DEBATE, supra note
95, at 149, 154-58; NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 114, at 10-11. And indeed,
being a burden on others is one reason people report choosing PAID. OR. HEALTH AUTH.,
supra note 24, at 12; Al Rabadi et al., supra note 21, at 5 ("Reasons patients choose to pursue
MAID include .. . in a small percentage, financial concerns.").
116. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731-32 (1997) ("The risk of harm
is greatest for the many individuals in our society whose autonomy and well-being are already
compromised by poverty, lack of access to good medical care, advanced age, or membership
in a stigmatized social group." (quoting N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW,
WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 120
(1994)).
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to protecting disabled and terminally ill people from prejudice, negative and
inaccurate stereotypes, and societal indifference.""
There may be more reason to be concerned about coercion or undue
influence in the context of an acquired disability that impairs cognition, such as
dementia, because unlike the case of a person who has always had decisional
impairements, a person with an acquired disability may have accumulated
significant assets prior to the onset of impairment; receive care from informal
caregivers; or seem like a different person than they were prior to their decisional
impairments. These factors may result in greater conflicts of interest with family
members who may not care as much about overriding the supported person's current
preferences.
Although these concerns are warranted, there are safeguards built into both
PAID and supported decision-making laws that decrease the likelihood of undue
influence and coercion. Such safeguards include, for example, having at least two
physicians involved in the PAID process and directions to third parties to contact
state protective services if abuse or neglect of the supported person is suspected.18
If the multiple healthcare professionals and the lay witnesses involved in the legally
required PAID process do not report abuse or neglect as mandated by supported
decision-making legislation and continue their role in the process of assisting a
terminally ill supported person with decisional impairments to hasten death with
PAID, this seems like sufficient evidence that there has not been coercion or undue
influence exercised upon the person with decisional impairments.1 19
4. Contextualizing Autonomy
There may be concerns that the analysis of whether terminally ill supported
persons with decisional impairments can autonomously elect to hasten death with
PAID focuses too much on the micro level of autonomy, ignoring the macro-level
constraints on autonomous decision-making. Both PAID and supported healthcare
117. Id. at 732 (quoting Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 593 (9th
Cir. 1995)). Although the Supreme Court in this case was concerned about bias against
persons with disabilities, other courts have affirmed the autonomy rights of persons with
physical disabilities while simultaneously assuming that such persons have a low quality of
life. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 304-05 (Ct. App. 1986) ("She,
as the patient, lying helplessly in bed, unable to care for herself, may consider her existence
meaningless. She cannot be faulted for so concluding. If her right to choose may not be
exercised because there remains to her, in the opinion of a court, a physician or some
committee, a certain arbitrary number of years, months, or days, her right will have lost its
value and meaning.").
It is unclear, however, the degree to which there is bias against persons with
disabilities relative to other groups such that persons with disabilities are more vulnerable.
Indeed, Congress has expanded legislative protections for persons with disabilities by
amending the ADA to cover more people, and states are adopting supported decision-making
legislation, which seems to indicate some degree of political influence.
118. See infra Part IV.
119. Additionally, if the terminally ill person with a decisional impairment is acting
without the assistance of a supporter, this may also decrease concerns about undue influence
and coercion, although concerns about understanding may increase. For a discussion of a
person with decisional impairments deciding in the absence of support, see infra Part III.
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decision-making laws focus on individual choice in the context of relationships with
physicians and supporters. But decisions are made in a larger context that shapes
what options are available to decision-makers. Admittedly, the discussion about
autonomy with respect to healthcare decision-making, and more specifically using
a supported decision-making agreement o gain access to PAID, is rather narrow. A
richer discussion of autonomy would examine factors that affect the available
options from which a person can choose.120
The primary reasons that persons report electing PAID are loss of
autonomy and dignity and the inability to do things that made life enjoyable.1 21 But
importantly, not wanting to be a burden on family and friends was listed as an end-
of-life concern by over half of persons who sought PAID in Oregon in 2018.122 This
concern may be because the United States does not have a good system of formal,
high-quality care for persons in late life, and the available options are prohibitively
expensive.12
So, when faced with the reality of expensive or nonexistent long-term care
or relying on informal family caregivers who must take time out of the labor force,
terminally ill persons may prefer hastening death through PAID. But if other options
were available, such as low-cost medical and nursing care, then perhaps people who
currently choose PAID would prefer to live until they die from other causes.1 24
120. See, e.g., Susan Sherwin, Relational Autonomy and Global Threats, in BEING
RELATIONAL: REFLECTIONS ON RELATIONAL THEORY AND HEALTH LAW 13, 19 (Jocelyn
Downie & Jennifer J. Llewellyn eds., 2012) ("Often ... people fail to act with full autonomy
because the options that are meaningfully available to them do not include a choice that is
compatible with their deepest values and needs."); Francis, supra note 51, at 83 ("Autonomy
requires not only the capacity for reasoned decision-making, but a reasonable range of
alternatives among which to choose... . [E]conomic insecurity, family rejection or pressures,
or availability of social services such as home care may significantly reduce the range of
available options."); Wright, supra note 10, at 1100 n.203 ("The background conditions of
social and economic inequality decrease true autonomy.").
121. OR. HEALTH AUTH., supra note 24, at 12. These are the concerns of people
who had capacity when hastening death with PAID. It is unknown whether terminally ill
persons without decisional capacity would have the same end-of-life concerns. Persons with
dementia, for example, may no longer care about autonomy when they become terminally ill
and thus eligible for PAID, and so may be less likely to pursue PAID based on autonomy
concerns compared to others. Persons with lifelong cognitive impairments may not
experience end of life as losing autonomy, and they may require no more care than they have
throughout their lives, which may also make them less likely to choose PAID or to have
different reasons for choosing this end-of-life option.
122. Id.
123. Crossley, supra note 113, at 905-09 (discussing the problem of privileging
autonomy when persons with disabilities do not have access to support). See generally Allison
K. Hoffman, Reimagining the Risk of Long-Term Care, 16 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. &
ETHICS 239 (2016).
124. Indeed, Oregon invested significant resources into ensuring that residents in
their state have access to high-quality hospice and palliative care so that terminally ill patients
have more options than PAID at the end of life. Francis, supra note 51, at 83-84. This may
be the reason why in 2017, 20% of persons who were prescribed life-ending medication under
Oregon's Death with Dignity Act did not use their prescription and died from other causes.
OR. HEALTH AUTH., supra note 24.
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Indeed, there may not be a concern about anyone, regardless of disability status,
being pressured into hastening their death against heir will if it was ensured that
persons could live a good quality of life without depleting their assets or relying on
informal caregivers.1 2 5 This would require significant government intervention to
ensure access to high quality, affordable long-term care to decrease burdens on
informal caregivers.126 Investing resources to ensure both autonomy and equality for
persons with disabilities127 necessarily implicates distributive justice concerns.128
Additionally, persons contemplating a future where they have a cognitive
disability such as dementia may want the option of using PAID because they cannot
imagine having a good quality of life with this type of disability. Recent scholarship
has demonstrated that living with cognitive impairments in late life is not necessarily
incompatible with a good quality of life, however.129 Both cultural and structural
changes, such as changing attitudes towards persons with cognitive impairments and
providing low-cost long-term care, would be necessary to convince persons
otherwise.
125. Indeed, some scholars have argued that he focus should not be on legalizing
PAID, but on expanding access to healthcare. See, e.g., John D. Arras, Physician-Assisted
Suicide: A Tragic View, in PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE: EXPANDING THE DEBATE, supra note
95, at 279, 294 ("[W]e should attack the problem at its root with an ambitious program of
reform in the areas of access to primary care and the education of physicians in palliative
care.... [W]e should thus first see to it that the vast majority of people in this country have
access to adequate, affordable, and ondiscriminatory primary and palliative care.... [W]hen
we finally have an equitable, effective, and compassionate healthcare system in place ... then
we might well want to reopen the discussion of PAS and active euthanasia."); Patricia A.
King & Leslie E. Wolf, Lessons for Physician-Assisted Suicide from the African-American
Experience, in PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE: EXPANDING THE DEBATE, supra note 95, at 91,
105 ("This conversation should be about changes and modifications that are required in the
training of healthcare providers and the delivery of healthcare services before we can be
confident that all patients will have the opportunity to die with dignity."). It is unclear whether
scholars with this view are open to PAID as an end-of-life option now that access to healthcare
has increased since the enactment of the Affordable Care Act.
126. See, e.g., Eva Feder Kittay, At Home with My Daughter, in AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS,
supra note 61, at 64, 74 (discussing barriers to home-based care for persons with significant
disabilities and asking "how many more families would be able and willing to [provide care
in] their own home if a truly full array of supportive services were to be made available not
only to the individual for medical treatment ... but to the family to continue keeping [the
individual with a disability] at home"). Disability organizations that oppose PAID also
advocate for more resources, specifically long-term care supports. NAT'L COUNCIL ON
DISABILITY, supra note 114, at 13.
127. Bickenbach, supra note 111, at 353 ("Inequality is exemplified in concrete and
practical terms by the absence of resources and opportunities that make it realistically possible
for a person to achieve what he or she wishes to achieve.").
128. Id. at 354 ("Antidiscrimination laws such as the ADA are shaped by social and
legal forces that, perhaps inevitably, turn their attention away from distributional issues.");
Batavia, supra note 111, at 290-91 (arguing that the ADA-although necessary to ensure
equality of opportunity-is insufficient because other interventions addressing poverty are
necessary for equality of opportunity).
129. See generally TIA POWELL, DEMENTIA REIMAGINED: BUILDING A LIFE OF JOY
AND DIGNITY FROM BEGINNING TO END (2019).
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The solution to cultural and structural constraints on autonomy is not to
decrease, but rather increase choice. Although it may be autonomy-promoting to
permit terminally ill supported persons with decisional impairments to access PAID
to hasten death, should this be their preference, it is more autonomy-promoting to
increase the available choices for persons facing serious illness. An increased
availability of healthcare choices is important, not just with respect to end-of-life
choices, but with respect o accessing the care persons need to live a good quality of
life and mitigating their concerns about burdening their families. Even if these
conditions changed, however, some terminally ill persons with decisional
impairments may still prefer to hasten death through PAID, and the law should
permit this autonomous choice.
B. Equality of Autonomy
Although supported decision-making may seem to only apply to persons
with cognitive disabilities, this model also accords with the healthcare decision-
making preferences of persons without cognitive disabilities who prefer to make
serious and late-life healthcare decisions in a relational manner. In the specific
context of end-of-life decision-making, both groups-persons with and without
decisional impairments-are similarly situated in terms of their decision-making
preferences and need for decision-making assistance and thus should be treated
equally.
If equal treatment under the law for persons with disabilities, including
persons with decisional impairments, i  valued, then they should be afforded all
legal options available to persons without disabilities. Equality could mean that no
one is permitted to hasten death with PAID,13 0 or equality could mean that everyone
who meets the PAID eligibility requirements can elect this end-of-life option.131 This
Article argues for the latter option: all persons, regardless of disability, should be
allowed to exercise autonomy with respect to end-of-life decision-making, even if
they require support to do so. That is, the law should respect the capacity of persons
to exercise autonomy, i.e., relational agency, regardless of whether they have a
cognitive disability.
When it comes to disability rights, arguments about equality and autonomy
are tightly linked.132 Disability advocates were influential in garnering support for
the ADA's passage, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability and
130. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 732 (1997) ("The State's
assisted-suicide ban reflects and reinforces its policy that the lives of terminally ill, disabled,
and elderly people must be no less valued than the young and the healthy, and that a seriously
disabled person's suicidal impulses should be interpreted and treated the same way as anyone
else's.").
131. For a different type of equality argument about PAID, see Ackerman, supra
note 115 (arguing that PAID should be available to everyone regardless of whether they are
terminally ill, or no one at all).
132. Jerome E. Bickenbach, Disability and Life-Ending Decisions, in PHYSICIAN-
ASSISTED SUICIDE: EXPANDING THE DEBATE, supra note 95, at 123, 131 ("The fact of the social
devaluation of the life of persons with disabilities, as a matter of both attitude and practice,
demands that the governing moral principle ought to be equality, and in particular equality of
autonomy."); Scotch, supra note 111, at 275.
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mandates reasonable accommodations so that persons with disabilities can be self-
determining and fully included in society.133 The ADA thus connects equal treatment
under the law with respect for the autonomy of persons with disabilities. 134
But what does equality mean for persons with decisional impairments?
Should persons with cognitive disabilities be treated the same as persons without
cognitive disabilities with respect to healthcare and end-of-life decision-making?13 5
Or because they have cognitive disabilities, which is perhaps a meaningful
difference with respect to decision-making, should they be treated differently in
order to have equality of opportunity or equal access to desirable goods,13 6 including
the exercise of autonomy?
Arguably, the ADA and other types of disability-specific legislation, such
as supported decision-making, accommodate multiple understandings of equality.137
The notion that persons with disabilities should have the same options as persons
without disabilities-e.g., in obtaining employment, in accessing buildings, in
making their own decisions, etc.-is grounded in formal equality, while the
recognition of and mandate to accommodate differences in order to access these
options-e.g., access to assistive devices, wheelchair ramps, supporters, etc.-is
grounded in substantive equality.
Tying together equality and autonomy leads to the conclusion that the law
should not prevent terminally ill supported persons with decisional impairments
from hastening death with PAID.138 Excluding such persons from this end-of-life
133. Compare Bickenbach, supra note 111, at 345 (describing how the ADA
connected nondiscrimination and equality to the independence and nonpaternalistic treatment
of persons with disabilities in the labor force), with Kittay, supra note 126, at 77-78
(critiquing the connection between equality and independence in disability law because some
persons with disabilities are never going to be capable of independence).
134. See supra note 62; 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2018) ("[T]he continuing
existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies people with
disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for
which our free society is justifiably famous, and costs the United States billions of dollars in
unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity.").
135. Equal treatment is formal equality, and many nondiscrimination laws are
premised upon this conceptualization of autonomy. See Equality of Opportunity, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Mar. 25, 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/equal-
opportunity/.
136. Substantive conceptualizations of equality recognize that treating different
groups the same, particularly marginalized groups, may lead to unequal outcomes. Id.; see
also LESLIE PICKERING FRANCIS & ANITA SILVERS, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES:
EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 61, at
163 ("Equality appears to require setting difference aside, but to be neutral with respect to a
difference such as disability ignores ways in which differences are relevant."); Iris Marion
Young, Disability and the Definition of Work, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING
IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 61, at 169, 169-
70.
137. Young, supra note 136.
138. This Article does not argue that terminally ill persons with decisional
impairments should hasten death with PAID; instead, this Article argues that PAID should be
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option violates formal equality. And if such persons use supporters to make
healthcare and other decisions to achieve the capacity required to make these
decisions, preventing them from accessing PAID with support violates substantive
equality. Indeed, supported decision-making can be seen as a reasonable
accommodation under the ADA so that persons with decisional impairments can
autonomously make their own healthcare, including end-of-life, decisions.139 Using
supported decision-making to exercise autonomy and achieve equal legal capacity
is also consistent with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.140
available as an option to this population. Cf Tuffrey-Wijne et al., supra note 49, at 14 ("In a
society where [assisted dying] is legalized and a clearly viable option in the eyes of a large
proportion of the population, as is the case in the Netherlands ... there should be clear and
compelling reasons if a person with an intellectual disability or autism spectrum disorder is
to be denied this option.").
139. Wright, supra note 90, at 30; see also Tuffrey-Wijne, supra note 49, at 19
("For disabled citizens to have equal rights (including the right to [assisted dying] in
jurisdictions where this is a legal option), there must be 'reasonable adjustments' in place to
ensure that the standard procedures do not leave them at a disadvantage.").
Some scholars argue that "profoundly mentally disabled" persons-i.e., some
persons with significant lifelong intellectual or developmental disabilities-are incapable of
self-determination and autonomy, and that the law should not afford them the same healthcare
decision-making rights as persons who were once considered competent to make their own
decisions. See, e.g., Cantor, supra note 108, at 40; Silvers, supra note 95, at 139. But this
view neglects the possibility that autonomy is possible through the provision of support.
140. United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 12,
Mar. 30, 2007, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3.
Prominent disability activists may argue that PAID is incompatible with equal
treatment or respect for the autonomy of persons with disabilities. NOT DEAD YET, supra note
114. But organizations purporting to represent he views of the disability community may not
actually do so. Indeed, some organizations note that persons with disabilities have diverse
views, but then argue that the important viewpoint is that of disability organizations and not
individuals with disabilities. NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 114, at 12.
Empirical research has demonstrated a diversity of views among persons with
disabilities about PAID. In one study, a sizeable minority of persons with physical disabilities
reported feeling positive about PAID legislation, and close to half of research participants
reported feeling ambivalent. Pamela Fadem et al., Attitudes of People with Disabilities
Toward Physician-Assisted Suicide Legislation: Broadening the Dialogue, 28 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 977, 985-87 (2003). Almost all study participants said that autonomy and self-
determination were important to them, but also expressed that they had experienced
discrimination on the basis of their disability that led to some concerns about PAID. Id. at
987-89. Importantly, however, persons in the study did not want any positive view of
legalizing PAID to be known because they feared criticism from disability activists. Id. at
991-93. Because the study only included persons with physical disabilities, it is unclear what
the views of persons with cognitive disabilities are with respect to PAID. Id. at 982.
It should not be surprising that people grouped together on the sole basis of
their disability status have different views. Not only do the experiences of disability differ by
type of disability, but persons with disabilities will also have other individual characteristics
and social statuses that lead to different views on issues such as the legalization of PAID.
Caution should be exercised in assuming that organizations such as Not Dead Yet represent
the views of all persons with disabilities about PAID, especially persons with disabilities who
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III. ACCESSING PHYSICIAN AID IN DYING WITH SUPPORT IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Examining how PAID and supported decision-making laws intersect has
more than just theoretical import given that both laws are spreading across the
United States, and these laws currently overlap in one U.S. jurisdiction: the District
of Columbia. This leads to the pressing question of whether in the District of
Columbia a terminally ill patient with cognitive impairments sufficient to result in a
physician determining that he patient lacked decision-making capacity could elect
PAID 141 under the D.C. Death with Dignity Act if they had a supported decision-
making agreement. Answering this question requires close examination of the D.C.
Death with Dignity Act and supported decision-making laws.
The District of Columbia's supported decision-making law explicitly
permits persons with decisional impairments to be supported in healthcare decision-
making.142 Assuming that a decision to elect PAID is considered a healthcare
decision,143 then a supported person should be able to receive assistance with
do not identify as disabled. See Kathy L. Cerminara, Musings on the Need to Convince Some
People with Disabilities That End-of-Life Decision-Making Advocates Are Not Out to Get
Them, 37 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 343, 348 (2006) (asserting that disability activists do not
necessarily represent the range of views of persons with disabilities about end-of-life
decision-making).
Regardless of whether disability organizations' opposition to PAID is in the
best interests of persons with disabilities, the anti-PAID view has implications for choices
available to persons without disabilities. Alicia Ouellette, Disability and the End of Life, 85
OR. L. REV. 123, 126 (2006) ("[T]he crusade by disability rights activists against freedom in
medical decisionmaking is [not] in fact in the best interests of people living with physical and
mental challenges, and ... in seeking to protect members of the disability community from
perceived and real threats, the activists would limit options for all of us by declaring how we
must, or, more correctly, how we must not die."). Further, these organizations' opposition to
PAID and other end-of-life options could harm the interests of persons with disabilities in
avoiding unwanted medical interventions. Cerminara, supra, at 381.
141. The District of Columbia , like Oregon, requires that a person requesting PAID
is "capable," which means that "a patient has the ability to make and communicate health care
decisions to health care providers." D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-661.01(2) (West, Westlaw through
Dec. 8, 2020). The District of Columbia's definition differs from Oregon's in that it does not
add "including communication through persons familiar with the patient's manner of
communicating if those persons are available." OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.800(3) (West,
Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.). In fact, Oregon's Death with Dignity Act definition of
"capable" encompasses one of the key elements of supported decision-making: assistance
with communicating a decision to third parties. Oregon's law is also consistent with the ADA,
which requires reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2018). As noted previously, supported decision-making can be a
reasonable accommodation under the ADA for persons with cognitive impairments. Wright,
supra note 90, at 30.
142. This includes physical, mental, and behavioral health. D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-
2132(d).
143. Some may object that electing PAID is not a healthcare decision, but an end-
of-life decision. Given the way jurisdictions in the United States have legalized aid in dying,
which requires involvement from physicians and other healthcare professionals, e.g.,
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choosing PAID, and assuming all other PAID eligibility requirements are met, not
be prevented from dying in this manner. In brief, in the District of Columbia a
terminally ill supported person with a decisional impairment may be able to elect
PAID with assistance from a supporter.
The question of whether a terminally ill supported person with a decisional
impairment could elect PAID in the District without assistance from a supporter is
more difficult to answer. Unlike supported decision-making laws in Indiana and
Alaska, which explicitly state that a supported person can act independently of their
agreement, and unlike supported decision-making laws in Delaware and Wisconsin,
which presume capacity for supported persons,144 the District's supported decision-
making law is silent on whether supported persons with decisional impairments can
make decisions without assistance. If PAID were legal in these other states, there
would be a stronger case that the terminally ill supported person with a decisional
impairment would be able to choose PAID even if no decision-making support were
provided; this is because these states' supported decision-making laws, in essence,
direct that the person with a disability retains legal capacity. In the District of
Columbia, however, it may be the case that the supported decision-making law's
silence on this issue would be interpreted by judges and healthcare providers to
prohibit the person with a cognitive disability from making decisions, including
PAID, without support.145
There are other components of the D.C. Death with Dignity Act that may
make it less likely that a terminally ill supported person with a decisional impairment
would be eligible for this end-of-life option. For example, the written request for the
aid-in-dying medication must be witnessed by two people who declare that the
pharmacists, mental health providers, etc., this decision is arguably both an end-of-life and a
healthcare decision. Furthermore, many life-ending decisions are also decisions to refuse or
discontinue medical treatment, which again erases the distinction between some healthcare
decisions and end-of-life decisions.
144. See Wright, supra note 57, at 287 (describing presumption of capacity in most
supported decision-makings laws).
145. This raises the question of what in the model of formal supported decision-
making provides legal capacity: the existence of the agreement with its declaration that the
person with a disability can act independently of the agreement or the provision of support to
assist in decision-making that leads to choices that further the interests of the person with a
disability (as defined by the person with a disability). I am grateful to Nina Kohn and Bob
Dinerstein for their insight on this question.
In the former case, no capacity assessment should ever beconducted because
the results are irrelevant; they have legal capacity regardless of what an assessment would
reveal. In the latter case, however, the important question is whether the provision of support
would increase decisional capacity to the point of passing a clinician-administered
assessment. That is, does the provision of decision-making assistance lead to an increase in
the understanding, appreciation, and reasoning abilities of the principal? If not, the principal
would be ineligible to make the particular decision, in this case to hasten death with PAID.
Case law is sparse on this issue, but courts in Texas view the abilities of a
person with a cognitive disability in light of the provision of support to determine whether
the person with a cognitive disability has legal capacity; that is, in Texas, the agreement is
insufficient to grant legal capacity, although this may differ in other states. Guardianship of
A.E., 552 S.W.3d 873, 889 (Tex. App. 2018).
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person making the request "[a]ppears to be of sound mind and not under duress,
fraud, or undue influence."146 It is unclear whether two witnesses would be willing
to attest that a person with moderate dementia, for example, who was seeking to use
PAID was of "sound mind." Perhaps these witnesses would have a broader
interpretation of "sound mind" if the person had supporters, however, and would be
willing to attest that the supported person with decisional impairments met the other
Death with Dignity Act requirements. 147
But the immunities and limitations on liabilities contained in both the D.C.
Death with Dignity Act and supported decision-making laws may increase the
likelihood that a terminally ill supported person with decisional impairments could
hasten their death through PAID. The District of Columbia supported decision-
making legislation contains the following provision: "Neither a person nor a District
agency shall be subject to criminal or civil liability, nor shall a person be considered
to have engaged in professional misconduct, for an act or omission done in good
faith and in reasonable reliance on a supported decision-making agreement."148 This
is coupled with the directive to third parties who are presented with the agreement
to "rely on the agreement, unless the person . .. has substantial cause to believe that
the supported person is an adult in need of protective services."149 And the D.C.
Death with Dignity Act states: "[N]o person shall be subject to civil or criminal
liability or professional disciplinary action for . . . [p]articipating in good faith
compliance with this chapter."150 Read together, these provisions imply that if a
physician was presented with a copy of a supported decision-making agreement by
their terminally ill patient who was requesting PAID, and in the absence of any signs
of undue influence or coercion by a supporter, the physician could rely on the
agreement and may not be liable for prescribing medication under the D.C. Death
with Dignity Act if the other parts of the PAID process required by law were
followed.
Still other provisions of these laws interact in unknown ways. For example,
the D.C. Death with Dignity Act contains the following: "A provision in a contract,
will, or other agreement executed on or after the effective date of this act, whether
written or oral, is not valid if the provision would affect whether a person may make
or rescind a request for a covered medication."151 Under a conventional reading of
this statutory text, a supported decision-making agreement would constitute a
"contract" or "other agreement" that "would affect whether a person may make ... a
request" for PAID. This is because the supported decision-making agreement
permits a person who otherwise would be ineligible to make their own decisions
(because of their cognitive disability) to make decisions with assistance from
146. D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-661.02(c) (West, Westlaw through Dec. 8, 2020).
147. Another question on which the District of Columbia's supported decision-
making law is silent is whether a supporter could act as a witness for PAID. According to





151. § 7-661.09. Oregon's statute contains a similar provision. OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 127.870(3)(12) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.).
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supporters, which may then make the person eligible for PAID. While this section
of the Death with Dignity Act, modeled after Oregon's, likely did not contemplate
supported decision-making, its plain meaning suggests that a supported decision-
making agreement may not be used to expand access to PAID for persons with
impaired decision-making capacity.
Because the issue of whether a terminally ill supported person with a
decisional impairment can access PAID has not been litigated in the District of
Columbia, however, it is unclear how these laws interact, and it is an open question
about whether such a person would be eligible for PAID in the District. 5 2 But given
the real possibility that terminally ill persons with decisional impairments may seek
to hasten death with PAID in jurisdictions with both laws, policymakers should
consider whether these laws should be changed both to promote autonomy and
provide sufficient protection for persons with cognitive impairments.
IV. QUESTIONS MOVING FORWARD
The prospect of terminally ill supported persons with decisional
impairments accessing PAID may make stakeholders, such as lawmakers, persons
with disabilities and their advocates, healthcare providers, and the public, uneasy
given the vulnerability of this population. That is, if choosing between freedom and
safety, legislators may decide to weigh safety more heavily for persons with
cognitive impairments and prohibit them from being able to choose PAID.1 53 But
equality of autonomy is important for persons with disabilities, and so it is necessary
to try to address stakeholder concerns about permitting terminally ill persons with
decisional impairments to hasten death with PAID so that this end-of-life option is
available to this population.
Conducting research on PAID and disseminating the results widely may
help reduce concerns. When legalization of PAID was being debated prior to its
recent spread across the United States, scholars and bioethicists were concerned that
members of marginalized groups would be pressured to hasten death with PAID. 154
To date, however, research has overwhelmingly found that patients who are
members of vulnerable groups have not been hastening death with PAID at a higher
152. It is also unclear what would happen if a person executed a supported decision-
making agreement in a jurisdiction that recognizes such agreements and then tried to access
PAID in a different jurisdiction that does not have supported ecision-making legislation.
153. If stakeholders view the possibility of coercion, undue influence, or mistakes
in electing to hasten death through PAID as unacceptably high for terminally ill persons with
decisional impairments, laws may prohibit supported persons accessing this end-of-life
option. It is unclear, however, whether courts would find such prohibitions to violate ADA or
constitutional rights.
154. See, e.g., King & Wolf, supra note 125, at 105 (predicting that the power
difference between physicians and their African-American patients coupled with racism and
unconscious bias would possibly render PAID safeguards ineffective for this patient
population).
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rate compared to other patients,1 5 5 and this information should be shared with the
public to assuage concerns.
Additionally, support for making all end-of-life choices available to
terminally ill persons with decisional impairments may increase if there are
safeguards to ensure that the requirements of autonomous decision-making-intent,
understanding, and voluntariness-are satisfied. This Part first examines existing
safeguards and then examines whether there should be additional safeguards built
into both PAID and supported decision-making laws to ensure respect for autonomy
of patients with cognitive disabilities at the end of life.
A. Existing Safeguards
There are existing safeguards and policies that limit unintended negative
consequences in both PAID and supported decision-making laws that may prevent
mistakes, undue influence, or their negative effects for terminally ill supported
persons with decisional impairments electing PAID. One existing policy in PAID
laws is the terminal-illness requirement to access PAID, restricting eligibility to
those at the end of life. 156 This ensures that a supported person with decisional
impairments would not be able to unintentionally or without understanding elect
PAID prior to becoming terminally ill, and a supporter or a physician would be
unable to pressure the person with a cognitive disability to use PAID unless the
155. See, e.g., Al Rabadi et al., supra note 21, at 5 ("These data reinforce the belief
that MAID has not been directed toward traditionally vulnerable populations based on age,
race/ethnicity, level of educational attainment, or insurance status."); Margaret P. Battin et
al., Legal Physician-Assisted Dying in Oregon and the Netherlands: Evidence Concerning
the Impact on Patients in "Vulnerable" Groups, 33 J. MED. ETHICS 591, 591 (2007) (finding
no evidence of increased use of PAID for "the elderly, women, the uninsured ... people with
low educational status, the poor, the physically disabled or chronically ill, minors, people with
psychiatric illnesses including depression, or racial or ethnic minorities"); Orentlicher et al.,
supra note 1, at 1962 ("Vulnerable patients are not succumbing to aid in dying."). But see
I.G. Finlay & R. George, Legal Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon and the Netherlands:
Evidence Concerning the Impact on Patients in Vulnerable Groups: Another Perspective on
Oregon's Data, 37 J. MED. ETHICS 171, 173 (2011) (questioning whether vulnerability is
properly understood in the PAID context and suggesting that older persons and persons with
depression may be more vulnerable to PAID).
Given that several studies have found that older persons and persons with
cognitive disabilities have not disproportionately used PAID, there may be reason to expect
that terminally ill older persons with cognitive disabilities are likewise not being pressured to
hasten death with PAID.
156. Orentlicher et al., supra note 1, at 1961 (arguing that the terminal-illness
requirement is appropriate because it ensures PAID is a "last resort").
Although some disability advocacy organizations point to anecdotes about
insurance companies denying treatments that will sustain lives while covering aid-in-dying
medication as evidence that persons with disabilities are coerced into hastening death with
PAID, their argument does not recognize that the terminal illness requirement still applies.
NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 114, at 11. That is, if PAID laws are followed,
then no person with a disability will have access to PAID unless they are also terminally ill.
Other scholars have drawn attention to the flawed arguments against PAID
made by disability activists. See, e.g., Ouellette, supra note 140, at 127 ("The theory that laws
allowing choice in dying perpetuate disability discrimination is flawed by conflation,
inflation, misidentification, and a misplaced operational definition of disability.").
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person had an estimated six months or less to live. While there may be mistakes, and
undue influence could be exerted upon a supported person with decisional
impairments once they were terminally ill, the cost would be limited to the very end
of life."
Other parts of PAID laws require involvement from other parties, who can
slow down the process or alert authorities to violations of the law, which also is an
existing safeguard.158 A second physician is required to confirm all of the eligibility
requirements for PAID prior to a patient gaining access to this end-of-life option;1 59
this increases the likelihood that mistakes, misunderstanding, or undue influence by
a supporter or the attending physician would be noticed and the PAID process
stopped. Additionally, physicians are required by law to refer their patients who may
be depressed or have other psychiatric disorders that may be affecting their decision
to use PAID to counseling prior to prescribing the medication.1 60 This adds yet
another party to the decision-making process who would be able to observe
mistakes, misunderstanding, coercion, or undue influence, and could slow the PAID
process down or stop it entirely. Moreover, the written request for PAID has to be
witnessed by two parties, one of whom is not related to the patient making the PAID
request,161 which provides another opportunity to observe that he request is being
made intentionally, voluntarily, and with understanding.
157. Some advocates for persons with disabilities are concerned that anyone
dependent upon life-sustaining medical interventions would be pressured to hasten death with
PAID, potentially missing out on decades of life. Unless the person with a disability was
terminally ill, they would not qualify for PAID regardless of whether they were reliant upon
medical technology to live. They could elect to withdraw treatment, however, hastening death
despite the prospect of many more years of life, as established in cases such as Bouvia v.
Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986).
158. Indeed, out of various end-of-life decisions, PAID is perhaps the most
protective of patient autonomy. Other life-ending decisions may not have as many persons
involved who can intervene if there is a mistake or wrongdoing on the part of healthcare
providers or surrogate decision-makers. In particular, the PAID process should be contrasted
with palliative sedation (previously known as terminal sedation), which occurs when a patient
is sedated and then artificial nutrition and hydration or other life-saving measures, such as a
ventilator, are withheld or withdrawn. In fact, none of the procedural safeguards present in
PAID are present in palliative sedation, which does not even have a terminal-illness
requirement. Jonathan F. Will, Dying with Dignity; Living with Laws (and Ethics), 49
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 6, 6-7 (2019). Other scholars have also noted problems with palliative
sedation compared to PAID, including that it prolongs the dying process, forces the patient to
die in the hospital, lacks a terminal illness requirement, and can be done without patient
knowledge and consent. David Orentlicher, The Supreme Court and Terminal Sedation: An
Ethically Inferior Alternative to Physician-Assisted Suicide, in PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE:
EXPANDING THE DEBATE, supra note 95, at 301, 302, 306-07 ("Terminal sedation serves fewer
of the purposes of right-to-die law while posing greater risks of abuse than assisted suicide.").
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Additionally, PAID laws require physicians to discuss all alternatives to
PAID, 162 field multiple requests for this end-of-life option,163 and ask their patients
if they would like to rescind their request prior to the patient's second oral request, 164
which ensures that a supported patient would know they can change their mind and
provides the opportunity for them to do so. Furthermore, if physicians follow ethical
advice from Oregon Health & Science University, which directs that physicians
should not initiate conversations about PAID with their patients,165 then many
patients, supported or not, may not know about this particular option, which
functions as a safeguard against mistaken or coerced opt-in. But following this
guidance also inhibits autonomy for patients who may otherwise be interested in this
end-of-life option.166
Moreover, any healthcare provider can opt out of participating in PAID, 167
and individual or organizational opt outs can function as safeguards. Because
physicians are not required to participate in PAID, even if they were otherwise
willing to prescribe PAID medication, they may decline to do so for some of their
terminally ill supported patients with decisional impairments if they did not believe
their patient's request was autonomous.
162. Alternatives include "comfort care, hospice care, and pain control." § 7-
661.03(a)(2)(E). Many patients are unaware of their end-of-life options, and the request for
PAID can serve as a catalyst for educating them. David Orentlicher et al., Clinical Criteria
for Aid in Dying, 19 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 259, 260 (2016).
163. The three-documented-requests requirement is also a much stronger
procedural safeguard against mistake or abuse than the safeguards available under other end-
of-life options such as withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment or palliative
sedation. See supra note 158.
164. § 7-661.03(a)(8).
165. THE TASK FORCE TO IMPROVE THE CARE OF TERMINALLY-ILL OREGONIANS,
THE OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT: A GUIDEBOOK FOR HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS §
15.41 (2007) ("Avoid exerting any influence over the patient's decision to request medication
or to revoke a rescission of such a request. Discussions concerning the Act should be initiated
by patients."). Vermont requires physicians to discuss all end-of-life options with their
patients, however. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1871 (West, Westlaw through Acts 1-180, M-1-
M-12 of the 2019-2020 Gen. Assemb.).
166. The American Public Health Association also recognizes this issue. AM. PUB.
HEALTH ASS'N, supra note 63 ("Empirical and anecdotal evidence reflect that health care
providers do not inform terminally ill patients of all options legal in the state in which the
patient is receiving care. As a result, patients are not able to make fully informed decisions
about care at the end of life. APHA rejects providing only partial information on which to
base health decisions.").
167. D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-661.10(a) ("No health care provider shall be obligated
under this act, by contract, or otherwise, to participate in the provision of a covered
medication to a qualified patient."). While the D.C. supported decision-making legislation
does not have a conscience opt out, it does permit third parties to refuse to rely on the
agreement if they think the supported person needs protective services. § 7-2133(e). Other
statutes or D.C. common law may provide conscience exceptions to healthcare providers
being required to rely on supported decision-making agreements. In other states with
supported decision-making legislation, there are some conscience opt outs for third parties
presented with a supported decision-making agreement. See Wright, supra note 57, at 301-
23 (describing laws).
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Also, organizational policy mediates access to PAID. 168 It may be the case
that physicians would be willing to prescribe PAID medication to their terminally
ill supported patients with decisional impairments, but the healthcare organization
with which they or their patient is affiliated opts out of participating in PAID
entirely, 169 or the organization has a policy that prohibits terminally ill supported
persons with decisional impairments from accessing PAID without additional
measures taken to ensure the patient's request is voluntary.
There is also a "natural" safeguard with respect to PAID in that very few
people choose this end-of-life option,170 meaning that legally expanding access to
currently ineligible persons may not result in significant uptake. In the District of
Columbia, for example, in 2017, the first year of PAID implementation, no one used
PAID.171 In 2018, four people were prescribed PAID drugs. 17 2 While there is no data
on the number of persons who have supported decision-making agreements in this
jurisdiction, in order for it to be a significant concern that terminally ill supported
persons with decisional impairments would access PAID unintentionally, without
understanding, or because of the undue influence of others, it would have to be
assumed that very large numbers of persons currently ineligible for PAID due to a
decisional impairment would enter a supported decision-making agreement and then
choose PAID. 173 Even if larger jurisdictions such as California were to pass
supported decision-making legislation that may make it possible for terminally ill
persons deemed incapacitated to access PAID, the number of persons presently
electing PAID in California is sufficiently low that the possibility of nonautonomous
use of PAID for terminally ill supported persons with decisional impairments would
also be extremely low.174 The benefits of expanding access to PAID to terminally ill
168. See generally Cindy L. Cain et al., Hospital Responses to the End of Life
Option Act: Implementation of Aid in Dying in California, 179 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 985
(2019) (describing hospital policies created in response to legalization of PAID in California).
169. Organizational opt out of PAID is a barrier to patient autonomy at the end of
life. If a patient is not geographically close to an organization that has opted into PAID, or
their health insurer does not contract with such an organization, their set of end-of-life choices
is reduced.
170. Orentlicher et al., supra note 1, at 1962.
171. DC HEALTH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT 2017
SUMMARY 3, https://dchealth.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/doh/page_content/attachment
s/DWD%20Report%202017%20Final%20%208-2-2019.pdf.
172. DC HEALTH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT 2018
SUMMARY 2, https://dchealth.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/doh/page_content/attachment
s/DWD%20Report%202018%20Final%20%20%208-2-2019.pdf.
173. Given that so few people have advance directives, it seems highly unlikely that
supported decision-making as a form of advance care planning will be widely adopted.
174. In 2018, there were 452 aid-in-dying medication prescriptions that resulted in
337 deaths. The total number of deaths in California in 2018 was 268,474. CAL. DEP'T OF
PUB. HEALTH, CALIFORNIA END OF LIFE OPTION ACT 2018 DATA REPORT 3 (2019),
https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHSI/CDPH%20Document%20Library/CDPH%20End
%20of%20Life%200ption%20Act%20Report%202018-FINAL.pdf. In states that have a
longer history of PAID, usage is similarly low.
Moreover, taking an intersectional approach to vulnerability demonstrates that
racial and ethnic minorities are not being pressured to hasten their deaths through PAID, in
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supported persons with decisional impairments who seriously desire this option and
for whom using PAID would be autonomy-promoting may thus outweigh risks of
mistake, misunderstanding, or undue influence.
Turning to safeguards in supported decision-making laws, an existing
safeguard is directions to third parties contained in copies of supported decision-
making agreements to report suspected abuse, neglect, or exploitation of the
supported person,17 5 a report that could be made by any of the many actors who
would know about and be involved in the PAID process, e.g., physicians, nurses,
pharmacists, healthcare organizations, long-term care facilities, etc. Furthermore,
certain types of people are ineligible to be supporters, such as individuals who have
harmed older persons or have been convicted of fraud,17 6 which prevents persons
who may be more likely to exert undue influence for their own interests from being
involved in the decision of a terminally ill supported person with decisional
impairments to seek PAID.
Additionally, the D.C. supported decision-making legislation does not
contain a liability waiver for supporters. This lack of immunity may lead a supporter
contrast to what was feared prior to adoption of PAID. Patricia A. King & Leslie E. Wolf,
Empowering and Protecting Patients: Lessons for Physician-Assisted Suicide from the
African-American Experience, 82 MINN. L. REv. 1015, 1015 (1997) (describing how African
Americans are concerned that healthcare providers do not value their lives as much as whites,
and arguing that African Americans are concerned that legalization of PAID will not function
to further their autonomy, but rather to result in their hastened deaths). In the racially and
ethnically diverse state of California, 88.4% of all persons who died using PAID in 2018 were
white whereas whites make up 36.8% of the state's population. Asian PAID users accounted
for 5.9% of PAID deaths while Asians comprise 15.3% of population; Hispanic PAID users
accounted for 3.9% of PAID deaths while Hispanics comprise 39.3% of the population;
African-American PAID users accounted for less than one percent of PAID deaths while
African Americans comprise 6.5% of the population; and persons who identify as "other" or
"multiple race" accounted for less than 1% of PAID deaths while this group comprises 3.9%
of the population. No Native Americans, Hawaiians, or Pacific Islanders used PAID, groups
which comprise 2.1% of the population. Other states show similar demographic statistics of
PAID users, with an overrepresentation of whites. Whether the low number of persons using
PAID and the very low number of racial-ethnic minorities using PAID is due to preferences
or other factors (such as lack of access to or knowledge about this option) is unknown, but
from these statistics it can be inferred that terminally ill supported persons with decisional
impairments who are members of racial and ethnic minority groups would likewise not be
pressured to use PAID if this were an available option. All population statistics are from the
U.S. Census and California Department of Public Health. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QuickFacts:
California (2018), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/CA; CAL. DEPT. OF PUB. HEALTH,
supra.
175. D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-2132(d) (West, Westlaw through Dec. 8, 2020) ("IF A
PERSON WHO RECEIVES A COPY OF THIS AGREEMENT OR IS AWARE OF THE
EXISTENCE OF THIS AGREEMENT HAS CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT THE ADULT
NAMED AS A SUPPORTED PERSON IS BEING ABUSED, NEGLECTED, OR
EXPLOITED BY THE SUPPORTER, THE PERSON MAY REPORT THE ALLEGED
ABUSE, NEGLECT, OR EXPLOITATION TO THE CITYWIDE CALL CENTER AT 311,




to decline to provide decision-making assistance with respect to PAID because they
fear liability for participating in the process (either under the supported decision-
making statute or the provision of the PAID statute that criminalizes coercion or
undue influence).7 7 Even in jurisdictions that do limit liability for supporters who
assist the supported person with decisional impairments in good faith, supporters are
expressly prohibited from "exerting influence upon" the supported person,178 and
fear of a finding of undue influence may prevent supporters from assisting with a
decision to pursue PAID. Finally, supported decision-making agreements can be
revoked by either party at any time,179 and so supporters may generally opt not to
assist in the PAID decision for reasons of conscience. Importantly, however,
supporters' fears of the legal consequences of providing decision-making assistance
are problematic if the terminally ill person with decisional impairments relies on
supported decision-making to exercise autonomy.
B. Building In Additional Safeguards?
Policymakers considering adding other legal safeguards to ensure
terminally ill supported persons with decisional impairments do not hasten death
through PAID by mistake or after being unduly influenced would have to expressly
confront the intersection of PAID and supported decision-making laws. 180 One
possible safeguard to address concerns about undue influence of supporters would
be to restrict what type of assistance supporters can provide with respect to the PAID
process. Perhaps supporters would be ineligible to communicate a request for aid-
in-dying medication on behalf of the supported person to ensure that the supporters
are not substituting their judgment for the person with the disability. Or supporters
could be prohibited from being present when the patient made the oral request to
their physician so that the physician could assess the voluntariness of their patient's
request. Or supporters could be disqualified from being witnesses for the written
PAID request, which would necessitate even more people being involved in the
process and assessing the voluntariness of the request.
The first two safeguards conflict with the entire premise of supported
decision-making, however, especially when persons with decisional impairments
require assistance with communicating decisions to third parties. The third possible
177. § 7-661.13.
178. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9406A(c)(1) (West, Westlaw through ch. 292
of the 150th Gen. Assemb.).
179. D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-2132(d).
180. Scholars studying jurisdictions where persons with developmental and
intellectual disabilities can access medical assistance in dying have argued for stricter
capacity assessments, i.e., higher evidence of capacity, for this decision for all persons as a
procedural safeguard against mistake or abuse, given that this decision is serious and
irrevocable. Tuffrey-Wijne, supra note 49. I do not make similar arguments because while
this proposal promotes equal treatment of persons with and without disabilities, if
implemented, it also potentially undermines autonomy.
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safeguard may thwart the autonomy of persons without an expansive network, an all
too common situation many older persons find themselves in. 181
Policymakers may consider requiring monitoring of supporters, however,
a practice that occurs in other countries with supported decision-making.18 2 The
practice of supported decision-making itself could be routinely monitored, or the
start of the PAID process for a supported person could trigger an audit of whether
the supported person is acting autonomously with respect to this end-of-life
decision.183 But requiring monitoring may slow down the PAID process, which
could result in the terminally ill supported person dying from other causes before
they can die with PAID.
States may also choose to modify their supported decision-making
agreement forms to include a section on whether the supported person desires
decision-making assistance at the end of life. If the supported person indicates that
they would like assistance with choosing whether to hasten death with PAID upon
becoming terminally ill, this may provide more assurance that a later decision to do
so is autonomous.
Given the extensive existing safeguards in both PAID and supported
decision-making laws together with the reality that adding in additional safeguards
may undermine the autonomy of terminally ill supported persons with decisional
impairments, I argue that, excepting the possible addition of monitors or revising
the form of the supported decision-making agreement, no additional legal
safeguards are necessary.184 But if policymakers or judges allow terminally ill
supported persons with decisional impairments to choose PAID, then it will be
necessary to limit liability for a supporter's assistance with this decision. 185 If there
are no liability limitations, then as discussed in the previous Section, supporters may
181. Marshall B. Kapp, Distinctive Factors Affecting the Legal Context of End-of-
Life Medical Care for Older Persons, 33 GA. ST. U.L. REv. 869, 874-75 (2017); Thaddeus
Mason Pope, Unbefriended and Unrepresented: Better Medical Decision Making for
Incapacitated Patients Without Healthcare Surrogates, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 923, 946-47
(2017).
182. MICHAEL BACH & LANA KERZNER, LAW COMM'N OF ONT., A NEw PARADIGM
FOR PROTECTING AUTONOMY AND THE RIGHT TO LEGAL CAPACITY 145 (2010). Scholars have
recommended use of monitors for supported decision-making in the United States. Leslie
Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again): Substituted Decision Making as a Violation of
the Integration Mandate of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L.
REv. 157, 173 (2010); Wright, supra note 57, at 310.
183. If monitoring of supporters is not routine, but specific to end-of-life decisions,
then monitoring should extend to supported decisions for palliative sedation or to withhold or
withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment, given that these other decisions currently lack
extensive procedural safeguards against mistake or abuse but have the same serious and
irrevocable consequence as PAID does.
184. Other remedies, such as wrongful death lawsuits, remain available in the case
of mistake or abuse. While the focus of this Article is on law, it is possible to add safeguards
to clinical practice. For example, as noted previously, it is a good idea for healthcare providers
to try to increase understanding for all of their patients by providing information on various
end-of-life options in the most accessible manner possible. See supra Section II.A.2.
185. Wisconsin limits liability for supporters who act prudently and in good faith.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 52.30(8) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 186).
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fear assisting in this particular decision, which would make it more difficult for a
terminally ill supported person with decisional impairments seeking PAID to access
this end-of-life option. That is, while much of the preceding discussion has focused
on potential harms to patient autonomy from supporters assisting in the PAID
decision, there are also potential autonomy harms from supporters not assisting in
the PAID decision.
CONCLUSION
Both PAID and supported decision-making laws, premised on respect for
autonomy, are becoming increasingly common in the United States. To date,
however, their intersection has been neglected. Indeed, the use of supported
decision-making to expand access to PAID for terminally ill persons with cognitive
impairments is likely far beyond how disability advocates intended this decision-
making model to be used.
This Article has evaluated whether autonomy is promoted for individuals
who hope to take advantage of both of these laws and has demonstrated that it may
be autonomy-promoting to allow terminally ill supported persons with decisional
impairments to choose to hasten death with PAID. That is, if autonomy is
conceptualized as relational agency, which is consistent with the model of supported
decision-making, persons with decisional impairments may be able to decide to
hasten death with PAID autonomously-intentionally, voluntarily, and with
understanding-with supporters' assistance.
Indeed, allowing terminally ill supported persons with decisional
impairments to elect PAID may do a better job at respecting autonomy and
promoting equality than existing PAID laws and proposed reforms to PAID.
Currently, terminally ill persons who are deemed incapacitated by their physicians
are not eligible to elect PAID, but this contemporaneous capacity requirement
discriminates against some persons, denying them choices available to similarly
situated others, e.g., other adults enduring a terminal illness,1 86 violating the
principle of equal treatment under the law and disrespecting their agency. And in
contrast to recent proposals to use advance directives to access PAID, should one
not have decision-making capacity upon becoming terminally ill, 187 supported
decision-making avoids problems with lock-in or misunderstanding that advance
directives create and allows for current preferences to be factored into the decision
to seek PAID, emphasizing present rather than precedent autonomy.188 Finally,
given the numerous procedures that must be followed to hasten death with PAID,
dying with PAID may be a death more likely to occur with the patient's consent than
186. Persons who do not have a disability associated with decisional impairments,
such as dementia, may actually have similar cognitive (dis)function when terminally ill, e.g.,
late stage cancer, further eroding the differences between these groups of individuals at the
end of life. Furthermore, it may be the case that PAID laws as applied could violate the ADA.
Indeed, scholars have argued that commonly accepted laws, such as guardianship, violate the
ADA. Salzman, supra note 182.
187. Menzel & Steinbock, supra note 52, at 24.
188. Supported decision-making also expands access to PAID for persons who have
never been considered to have the legal capacity required to execute an advance directive.
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other types of medically assisted dying, e.g., withholding or withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment or palliative sedation.189
Although there are valid concerns about terminally ill persons with
disabilities, particularly cognitive disabilities, not autonomously choosing PAID,
e.g., electing this end-of-life option through mistake or after being coerced, these
concerns should not be addressed by denying such persons the opportunity to
choose.190 Indeed, excluding terminally ill persons with decisional impairments
from this end-of-life option out of a desire to protect them from harm is paternalistic
and reinforces stereotypes of persons with disabilities as weak and incapable of
autonomy.191 As the Congress that passed the ADA noted, "[I]ndividuals
with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination,
including . . . overprotective rules and policies."1 92
This Article has argued that there should instead be equality of autonomy
at the end of life for persons with cognitive disabilities and that terminally ill persons
with decisional impairments should have the same end-of-life options as persons
without disabilities. Further, such persons should be able to use supported decision-
making if necessary to make their end-of-life decisions autonomously. It remains
important to consider how structural and cultural conditions, such as lack of access
to high-quality long-term care, impact end-of-life decision-making, however, and to
invest resources to increase the number of options available to everyone at the end
of life. But in brief, permitting supported persons with cognitive impairments to
make life or death decisions is anti-paternalistic, autonomy respecting, and equality
promoting.
189. Helga Kuhse, From Intention to Consent, in PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE:
EXPANDING THE DEBATE, supra note 95, at 252, 262-63 (describing results of a study that
compared physician-assisted death in a jurisdiction where euthanasia is legal and a
jurisdiction where euthanasia is not legal and found that there is a significantly lower rate of
euthanasia in the absence of patient consent in the jurisdiction where this practice is legal than
the jurisdiction where the practice is illegal).
190. Restricting choices guarantees that some persons will not have their autonomy
respected at the end of life. Making all end-of-life options available, especially in light of
PAID safeguards, decreases the likelihood that autonomy will not be respected.
191. Silvers, supra note 95, at 135 ("[T]he history of marking marginalized groups
as needing special protection is replete with instances in which to characterize a class of
persons as weak is to deprive them of the power of self-determination."); id. at 144
(" [F]raming the issue so that state interest is more significant than personal interest devalues
rather than defends people on the basis of their disabilities."); Young, supra note 136, at 169-
70 (noting that treating people differently may "reinscribe differences").
192. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (2018); see also Silvers, supra note 95, at 142
("[R]egardless of whether individuals with disabilities are competent to decide if their
suffering should be prolonged, no one of them may do so in order to safeguard other members
of their class from nondisabled people who desire their suicides."); Samuel R. Bagenstos,
Disability, Life, Death, and Choice, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 425 (2006) (discussing end-of-
life and reproductive choices in the context of disability).
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